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POLICY BRIEF No. 1   •   MARCH 2000 
This policy brief summarizes lessons learned from 
IFPRI´s multicountry program on rural finance and 
household food security with regard to the poors’ 
demand for financial services. The lessons are 
derived from detailed household surveys conducted 
in nine countries of Asia and Africa: Bangladesh, 
Cameroon, China, Egypt, Ghana, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Nepal, and Pakistan. 
 
 
 
At first glance, many might be tempted to say that 
the poor earning less than $1 per day are not 
creditworthy, able to save, or able to afford 
insurance against the risks they face. That this myth 
is wholly unfounded has been demonstrated time 
and again by empirical research on informal 
financial markets and risk-coping behavior of 
households. Poor households are indeed willing to 
pay market rates for reliable and continued access to 
different types of financial services, including 
insurance. Credit and savings facilities can help 
poor rural households manage—and often 
augment—their otherwise meager resources and 
acquire adequate food and other basic necessities. 
Credit facilities enable the poor to tap financial 
resources beyond their own and take advantage of 
profitable investment opportunities. Well-managed 
savings facilities provide incentives for households 
to build up funds for investment or future 
consumption. Credit and savings facilities enable 
farmers to invest in land improvements or 
agricultural technology such as high-yielding seeds 
and fertilizers that increase incomes (while 
sustaining the natural resource base). For landless 
rural households, credit and savings facilities can 
help establish or expand family enterprises, 
potentially making the difference between grinding 
poverty and an economically secure life. Short-t rm 
bor owing or savings are often used to maintain 
consumption of basic necessities when household 
incomes decline temporarily, e.g., after a bad 
harvest or between agricultural seasons.  
 The myth of the unserviceable poor should also 
have been laid to rest by the recognition of an 
increasing number of successful institutional inno-
vations that provide savings, credit, and insurance 
services to poor people in developing countries. 
 
 
 
 Faulty perceptions about the poor have led to 
faulty policy strategies and financial products. Much 
of financial policy at the end of the 1980s and even 
today has been based on the unserviceable myth, 
leading to well-meant, but inefficient and costly 
policies for the development of financial institutions 
with negligible outreach to and impact on the poor. 
Either the poor were thought uncreditworthy or un-
able to pay market interest rates. The former myth 
led to policy inaction, whereas the latter led to mas-
ive interest rate subsidies. The myth that the poor 
were unable to save or to insure induced past policy 
to neglect altogether the savings and insurance 
services that are particularly relevant to the poor. 
 
 
 
 
 To satisfy the demand for financial services by the 
poor through institutional and product innovation is 
ot possible without a thorough appreciation of the 
issue of food insecurity. In the nine countries of the 
IFPRI research program, households belonging to 
TheMyth Has Led to Wrong Policies 
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the lowest income quartile spend as much as 91 
percent of their consumption budget on food. On 
average for all households in the nine countries, 60–
70 percent of exp nditures in incurred for food. No 
wonder then that much of the demand for loans, 
savings, and insurance services by the poor is driven 
by their motivation to avoid food insecurity.  
 The average cumulative yearly amount borrowed 
by poor households from the formal and informal 
sectors ranges from about US$4 in Malawi to $80 in 
Bangladesh to $133 in Cameroon. Informal lend-
ers—friends, relatives, neighbors, informal groups, 
or moneylenders—provide the bulk of loans. In 
Pakistan and Cameroon, less than 5 percent of the 
amount borrowed by poor rural households was 
obtained from formal lenders such as state and 
agricultural development banks and microfinance 
institutions (e.g., credit unions, cooperatives, and 
group-based programs run by government, non-
governmental organizations, and village banks). The 
IFPRI program shows that several member-based 
microfinance institutions successfully reach the 
poorest income quartiles in Bangladesh and Malawi.  
 Overall, however, the formal sector lends 
disproportionately more to upper income groups. 
The poor obtain a smaller share of their loans from 
the formal sector than the nonpoor in six countries 
(China, Egypt, Madagascar, Malawi, Nepal, and 
Pakistan). Even in a country like Egypt, with a 
relatively dense coverage of formal financial 
institutions, the role of informal lenders remains 
important.  
 Many loans obtained by poor households are used 
for consumption, mainly of food. About 50–9  
percent of loans obtained from the formal and 
informal sectors combined went to consumption-
related purchases. In Pakistan, more than 80 percent 
were spent on consumption. Moreover, in six out of 
eight countries, loans for consumption are more 
important for the poorest quartile than for the 
nonpoor. In every country, the share of loans used 
for consumption was higher for informal loans than 
for formal loans.  
 In poor households, the spheres of consumption, 
production, and investment ar  inseparable in the 
sense that consumption and nutrition are important 
to a household’s ability to earn income. If a laborer 
does not have enough to eat, he may be too weak to 
work productively. In general, family labor is by far 
the most important producti n factor, and the 
maintenance and enhancement of labor productivity 
is central for securing and increasing income. 
Bankers in particular frequently argue against 
consumption loans on the grounds that loans should 
finance activities that generate income for repaying 
the loan. The reality, however, is that consumption 
loans have to be considered as working capital loans 
for maintaining and enhancing the production factor 
labor. While the wealthy may invest in land and 
capital assets, the poor invest in their labor. Both 
types of investment have economic returns that can 
generate cash income for loan repayment. 
 
 
 
 The truth is that the poor are creditworthy, can 
sav , and pay for insurance—they have done it all 
along as the myriad of informal savings, credit, and 
insurance arrangements between friends, relativ s, 
and other networks daily demonstrate. But it is also 
true that financial institutions (and related knowl-
edge and technology) as well as an enabling policy 
environment were not in place in the past (and still 
are not in many countries). Because the two gaps 
were not given due consideration in central and 
commercial, as well as parastatal, banks, the poor 
were simply deemed to be unbankable. To put it 
p sitively, the microfinance revolution taught that 
institutional innovations—not just technological 
ones—and related changes in the legal and regula-
tory policy framework could extend the feasibility 
frontier of sustainable finance to r aching the poor. 
While increasing numbers of people living around 
or somewhat below the poverty line are reached by 
inn vations in financial institutions, outreach to the 
poorest, especially in rural and disadvantaged areas, 
remains low.  
 Research by IFPRI on the demand for financial 
services points out that product innovation that 
responds to the food security motives of rural 
households can lead to higher outreach and hig er 
impact on the poor. However, policy also needs t
recognize that while the poor are creditworthy and 
able to save and insure, financial institutions may 
still fail to cover their costs, even with improved 
products. Many of the poor, particularly in remote 
areas having high transaction costs, still cannot be 
served by financially sustainable institutions. The 
primary role of policy should therefore be to foster 
institutional innovations, such as the development of 
new information technologies, which can allow this 
to occur.¾ 
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POLICY BRIEF No. 2   •   MARCH 2000 
The spectacular growth of the microfinance industry 
has been fueled not by market forces but by con-
scious actions of national governments, nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), and donors who view 
microfinance as an effectiv  tool for alleviating 
poverty. Since much of the impetus behind this 
large and increasing support for microfinance hinges 
on the assumption that its economic and social 
impacts are significant, it needs to be examined 
more closely. 
 
 
 
Some question the value of assessing impact in 
the first place, arguing that when institutions that 
serve the poor attain financial viability, a level of 
impact that justifies investment is automatically 
assured. After all, profitability—the extent to which 
revenues exceed costs of providing services—is a 
reflection of the extent to which returns to clients 
from whatever they finance are high enough to pay 
for the financial services they received. This 
approach, however, is not of much help when it 
comes to evaluating institutions that are not yet 
financially sustainable but that are assumed to make 
significant contributions to poverty alleviation and 
depend on continuing public support to remain 
operational. When confronted with this type of 
situation, policymakers, who have to allocate public 
resources between competing ends, ask how credit 
programs affect broader social goals such as 
adoption of agricultural technology, income genera-
tion, and attainment of food security. Sometimes 
even broader goals are considered such as women’s 
empowerment or enviromental quality. Assesing 
these benefits helps policymakers evaluate the 
relative weight to atach to credit programs vis-à-vis 
other poverty alleviation programs and helps them 
answer the question of whether shifting resources 
away from other poverty programs toward credit-
based programs is good social policy. 
 
 
 
 Two types of impact studies have been conducted. 
First are those that may be termed “investment-led,” 
since they attempt to measure returns on credit as an 
input that facilitates investment. They attempt to 
answer the question of whether greater acc ss to 
credit leads to greater levels of income, wealth, and 
consumption. The second type of studies may be 
termed “insurance-led,” as they measure the extent 
to which access to credit assists households in 
upholding essential expenditures in the aftermath of 
unexpected income shocks (e.g., bad harvests) or 
expenditure shocks (e.g., health emergencies). A 
common methodol gical problem in conducting 
impact research is the difficulty of finding a satis-
factory control group that can be used to isolate the 
ffects of improved access to microfinance services.
For example, the level of entrepreneurial skill is 
likely to affect an individual’s decision to join a 
microfinance prog am. But because entrepreneurial 
skill is hard to observe and quantify, finding a con-
tr l group that actually controls for this unobserved 
trait would be difficult. This, in turn, makes it 
difficult to obtain a clean estimate of the effects of 
improved access. In recent years several studies 
have attempted to address this problem by using 
quasi-random experimental methods, qualitative 
surveys, special instruments that measure access to 
credit, and panel data techniques. However, two 
additional caveats are noted. First, investme ts yield 
a flow of returns over time, so the time profile of 
The Format of Impact Studies 
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yields and the timing of the impact study have an 
important bearing on the magnitude of benefits 
reported. Second, many microfinance institutions 
bundle credit with other services (training, health, 
etc.) and the reported impact is likely to include the 
effect of such services. 
 
 
 
Overall, the investment-led studies present mixed 
results of the impact of credit on various indicators 
affecting household welfare. Apart from methodo-
logical differences, country- and program-specific 
conditions drive results of these studies. For ex-
ample, the xtent to which households have access 
to other complementary production inputs may 
affect the returns to credit. Studies in Bangladesh, 
Malawi, and Madagascar reiterate that access to 
credit carries good returns to poor households only 
when complementary inputs such as seeds or 
irrigation water, or market access are present.  
The impact of credit on household food security 
via increases in household productivity and income 
also falls under the same cveatas above. However, 
it is found again and again that most loans taken by 
the poor, especially in the informal sector, are for fi-
nancing consumption-related expenditure, especially 
during low-income seasons. Despite this fact, the 
effect of credit on the nutritional status of children 
has generally remained unclear—mainly because 
nutritional outcomes are strongly conditioned by 
many other factors on which credit, by itself, has 
little effect. 
Many microfinance services in Asia and Africa 
target women on the assumption that empowering 
women and targeting services to them leads to better 
allocation and use of household resources. Several 
studies in Bangladesh support this assumption, 
indicating that services directed to women signifi-
cantly increase assets, incomes, and educational 
attainment of children, especially girls. But positive 
gender eff cts cannot always be taken for granted, 
as other studies, also in Bangladesh, highlight cases 
where only a few of the targeted women were able 
to exercise ffective control over loan use. Some 
point out that some-times the very lack of women’s 
empowerment makes it easier for program managers 
to enforce loan conditions, thus making them 
preferable borrowers. 
 
  
 
 A number of studies in Asia suggest that poor 
households generally use a combination of savings, 
credit, and increased wage employment to cope with 
income volatility and unexpected expenditure 
requirements. Access to credit and saving services 
makes it feasible for households to borrow during, 
or save for, adverse times; thus access to financial 
services has an important impact on the welfare of 
the poor. The importance of access to financial 
services increases with the severity of income 
downturns. When households confront severe events 
such as floods or drought that depress their incomes 
temporarily, access to financial services, especially 
in the informal sector, enables them to buy enough 
food to maintain the nutritional status of their 
children and finance other important activities such 
as education.  
The insurance cover provided by access to credit 
and savings also has an impact on the efficiency 
with which household resources are managed. For 
example, with the insurance cover, poor households 
may be emboldened to undertake more efficient, 
albeit riskier, projects to increase household income, 
such as adoption of new agricultural technology or 
off-farm microenterprise. Insurance benefit studies 
show evidence of consistent positive impact, per-
haps because insurance benefits, unlike investment 
benefits, are conditioned less by access to or 
ownership of other comple- entary inputs. 
 
 
 
Impact-benefit studies are still somewhat clouded 
by methodological issues, i.e., the difficulty of 
obtaining a comparable control group. There are
also several other considerations. First, most credit 
programs studied are actually hybrids that bundle 
credit with other services such as health and 
education. Disentangling credit impact from overall 
impact and accounting for the full range of benefits 
produced by a program is a challenging task. Sec-
ond, many microfinance programs also induce em-
powerment at the community level by enabling col-
lective action as well as by setting the foundation 
for sustainable community-based organizations. A 
more complete evaluation needs to account for these 
types of benefits. Third, many impact studies fail to 
reveal the exact processes by which poverty is 
affected. To improve the impact of microfinance, 
more explicit discussion of the actual process of im-
pact is needed. Finally, impact has been evaluatd 
only for the most successful programs, and general-
ization can be dangerous. 
Whatever the current size of impact, further 
incr ases in benefits per dollar of investment criti-
cally depend on cost-saving innovations that micro-
finance institutions make. Public support to fuel this 
process is critical, especially since private market-
based initiatives are hardly forthcoming. Returns on 
such efforts will be substantial, but strongly condi-
ti ned on access to other comple-mentary inputs. 
Our review also indicates that impact studies them-
selves must be improved to make more accurat
assessments of benefits. This is important, for only 
through cycles of innovation, experimentation, and 
evaluation can we hope to establish lasting insti-
tutions that alleviate the financial constraints faced 
by the poor.¾ 
Remaining Gaps 
Results of Investment-Led Studies 
Results of Insurance-L d Studies 
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POLICY BRIEF No 3   •   MARCH 2000 
This policy brief reviews evidence and draws lessons 
regarding the role of microfinance for income and 
consumption smoothing by the poor, and highlights 
potential areas for product innovation by the micro-
finance sector to address the demand for financial 
services for income and consumption smoothing. 
 
 
 
 
Poor, food-insecure households seek to avoid the risk 
of falling below a minimum level of consumption of food 
and other basic goods that would threaten their survival. 
In general, there are two types of risk coping, income 
smoothing and consumption smoothing. Households can 
smooth income by making conservative production or 
employment choices, diversifying economic activities, or 
taking steps to protect themselves from adverse income 
shocks before they occur. Households can smooth 
consumption by borrowing and saving and by employing 
formal and informal insurance arrangements. These 
actions help insulate consumption from income 
variability. 
 In short, improved access to financial services can have 
two principal effects on households. First, it can raise the 
expected value of income and therefore of consumption 
and future investment and asset accumulation. This is the 
traditional and often sole argument for provision of 
services by MFIs. Second, it can decrease the downward 
risk of too low an income to satisfy basic consumption 
needs. Poorer households, for which this consideration is 
especially important, end to value financial services that 
address the risk-coping motive relatively more, while 
wealthier households tend to place higher value on finan-
cial services that generate income and aid the accumu-
lation of assets. 
 
 
  
 A number of studies reviewed in a synthesis paper by 
IFPRI (see references) show that lack of access to 
financial services for income and consumption smoothing 
can have serious implications on livelihood. For example, 
the nutritional status of children in poorer households in 
Bangladesh severely suffers in the aftermath of disastrous 
floods as a result of insufficient informal coping mecha-
nisms and access of credit. Similarly, a study in Peru 
found that during adverse times, credit-constrained 
parents tend to withdraw children from school and put 
them into income-earning jobs. In India, child labor plays 
a significant role in the self-insurance strategy of poor 
rural households. 
Most formal credit and savings services are not useful 
for consumption smoothing because they may be ap-
pr ved only after considerable waiting time, carry high 
transaction costs, or specifically given for production 
purposes. In the same vein, many commonly found sav-
ngs products are of little use to those who wish to save 
because of precautionary motives, e.g., some savings de-
p sits may only be withdrawn after a waiting period or, as 
is common in the majority of credit-focused microfinance 
schemes, a fixed percentage may be held to scure a loan. 
IFPRI’s studies point out that much of the savings
behavior of the poor is motivated by the wish to hold 
precautionary savings so as to retain capacity for future 
consumption smoothing. It is important to recognize that 
such savings can be held in four different forms. First, 
households may hold buffer stocks in the form of assets 
that can be liquidated in the event of transitory income 
shocks. Livestock, food, and money under the pillow are 
common forms of precautionary savings in developing 
countries. These informal savings are subject to a number 
of risks, such as inflation, animal disease, and theft. 
Second, households may choose not to fully utilize 
available credit limits but preserve the option to borr w 
for “worse” times. Third, precautionary savings c n be 
held in the form of human capital, for example, by having 
more children to meet unxpected future shortages in 
family labor due to health risks, or by having better-
educated children. Finally, investing in personal 
r lationships and membership can generate precautiona y 
avings in the form of social capital, for example, in 
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social and other institutions at the community level. It is 
not unreasonable to expect that social capital, like any 
other form of capital, can be used more intensiv ly in 
future periods when transi ory income shocks occur. The 
culture of reciprocal gift giving is deeply embedded in 
many societies. Having more social capital can increase 
one’s (insurance) claims toward society. 
 
 
 
 
It is important to distinguish between idiosyncrat c and 
covariant risks, that is, risks that affect only some i di-
viduals or larger groups of people in the same locality, re-
spectively. Covariant risks include, for example, drought 
and flood, whereas individual risks are disability to work 
or old age. Since most MFIs in developing countries at 
present are too small in terms of number of clientele and 
geographical coverage, their ability to effectively cover 
covariant risks is very limited. However, as MFIs grow 
over time and reach operational scales like those achieved 
by Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), BRAC, or the Grameen 
Bank, there is also considerable potential to sustainably 
address covariant risks. For example, the Grameen Bank 
and BRI have rescheduled loans to clients in areas of 
natural disasters. BRI can do this without assistance from 
the state because of its high profits and its business 
conviction that the loss of a good borr wer is also a loss 
to BRI. The Grameen Bank has also rescheduled loans for 
clients affected by flood. The Grameen Bank requires 
members to deposit small amounts of savings into a so-
called emergency fund. The pooling of such funds over 
larger areas can, in principal, address covariant risks. 
A few innovative MFIs have developed financial 
products that address idiosyncratic risks. While MFIs 
should not be overburdened by being asked to provide 
health insurance services, MFIs can provide precau-
tionary savings services and consumption credit that can 
indirectly address health risks. For example, village banks 
that follow the FINCA model or the model developed by 
the French NGO Centre International de Développement 
et de Recherche (CIDR) raise funds for internal consump-
tion loans for their members. Other examples of MFIs 
that explicitly provide consumption credit, include Caja 
Social in Mexico and BRAC in Bangladesh. SEWA in 
India, which targets microloans to very poor women, 
allows borrowers to stop loan repayment during preg-
nancy. Health risks can also be addressed by the provision 
of precautionary savings services. This type of service is
useful for many types of risks, provided that the maturity 
of the deposit, its interest rate, and its transaction costs for 
deposits and withdrawals on short notice are adjusted
accordingly. For health risks that occur relatively fre-
quently and demand immediate response, the cost and 
time for withdrawal must be minimal. A current account 
at a village bank or a nearby bank branch offers such 
features as does a term deposit that can be withdrawn at 
short notice with a penalty. Examples of banks that 
successfully offer savings services to a diverse clientel , 
including the poor, are BancoSol in Bolivia and BRI in 
Indonesia. 
A number of MFIs offer life insurance to cover risks of 
death or lack of care duing old age. Most often, however, 
the contract only covers the borrower’s outstanding debt 
in case of death. This is the case, for example, for BRI or 
ASA in Bangladesh. BRAC, on the other hand, offers a 
life insurance contract that pays a predetermined sum in 
case of the member’s death. 
Because of sociocultural constraints, women often 
cannot get a loan unless they are married and their 
husband is a cosigner. MFIs ought to refuse to practice 
such discrimination. By providing women with individual 
credit lines and savings accounts, their househld 
bargaining power may increase. Moreover, individual 
accounts for women will enable them to have a much 
stronger economic position in case of family breakup. 
 
  
 
Access to microfinance has the potential not nly to 
assist the poor to earn income from mic enterprise, but 
also to smooth income and consumption. The first 
potential effect is what primarily motivates the 
microfinance movement today. Yet, the second-effect 
increases in relative importance as the poverty level of 
MFI-clients increases. MFIs, especially if they seek to 
benefit the poor, should concentrate more effort on credit, 
savings, and insurance services that can mitigate risks. 
The largest potential for microfinance is seen for 
addressing idiosyncratic risks, such as those related to 
health, disability, old age, and divorce. When MFIs grow 
in scale and increase their outreach to both poor and 
nonpoor groups, they also increase their potential to h lp 
their clients’ address covariant risks. 
A number of innovative MFIs offer financial products 
th t respond to these risks. These includ flexible saving 
services that permit prompt withdrawals, consumpt on 
credit, and even explicit health and life insurance. 
The poorer the target group of an MFI, the more 
important is that MFI’s experiment with new products for 
income and consumption smoothing. Through pro-poor 
product innovation, the MFIs’ costs of targeting the poor 
may decrease. However, when MFIs choose to broaden 
their offering of financial services, they must be aware of 
the greater portfolio and liquidity risks that such a 
strategy entails. Prudence would suggest that MFIs first 
target areas with low covariant risks, and gradually 
expand client outreach to higher risk areas. Higher 
liquidity reserves and larger equity capital apear also to 
be appropriate responses to covariant risks. Client-funded 
emergency funds that are pooled over large areas have the 
pot ntial to spread these risks at sustainable levels.¾ 
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 Governments, policymakers, and donors attach a 
great deal of importance to poverty outreach—the 
extent to which MFIs serve poor and disadvantaged 
locations—when evaluating microfinance institutions 
(MFIs). One may ask why this consideration is 
important. First, for many policymakers and planners, 
regional or area-specific growth and equity outcomes 
are important. Second, there is a widespread but 
implicit assumption that because MFIs serve the poor, 
by implication they serve the poor everywh r , but this 
cannot be taken for granted. As with most other 
industries, the very nature of the products and tech-
nology, and the constellation of incentives within MFIs 
may be such that certain locations are systematically 
favored while others are systematically avoided. 
Studies of the location of services by commercial 
banks in Bangladesh and India find that they generally 
favor economically well-endowed areas. Is this the 
case with MFIs as well? For example, what kinds of 
tensions arise between orgaizational goals, perform-
ance standards, and operational requirements, and how 
do these affect placement of branches? Once branches 
have been established, are levels of client coverage 
similar across branches? What factors drive the differ-
ences? Answers to such questions assist policymakers 
and project managers to recognize operational con-
straints and improve product design and service 
delivery. Third, a better knowledge of the determinants 
of placement assists in disentangling program effects 
from location effects and hence becomes useful in the 
assessment of the impact of credit programs.  
 
 
 
With the above considerations in mind, IFPRI 
undertook a study of the service placement of three 
major NGOs in Bangladesh: the Association of Social 
Advancement (ASA), the Bangladesh Rural Advance-
ment Committee (BRAC), and Proshika Manobik 
Unnayan Kendra (PROSHIKA). All three institutions 
have large nationwide networks of branches and pro-
vid  credit on the basis of group liability to a closely 
targeted population consisting of poor households. 
Three-hundred-and-ninety-one thanas from all over 
Bangladesh were considered for the study. Data on the 
thana-wide existence of branches of three institutions 
and their client density (number of clients per 1,000 
persons in the thana) were collected for the year 1994 
and then mapped on thana-wide indicators of poverty 
level and infrastructure o discern placement. These 
indi ators were collected from statistical yearbooks 
published by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and 
from Helen Keller International in Dhaka. 
 
 
 
 Since profit making is not the principal aim of the 
NGOs, standard economic principles provide little 
guidance in analyzing determinants of their service 
placement rules. However, two important pointers are 
available. First, all three NGOs came into being princi-
pally in response to the challenge of delivering basic 
social services to an impoverished population that had 
been devastated by war. Second, all three NGOs 
received—or continue to receive—funding from gov-
ernments and donors, and are likely to be bound by 
various conditions related primarily to maintaining 
minimum standards of financial performance (e.g., 
caps on delinquency rates and administrative costs) 
and of positive program impact. These conditions led 
the authors to hypothesize that there are four expected 
determinants of branch placement and client coverage 
that can be empirically tested using the collected data. 
1. Poverty-targeting. All three NGOs claim to be 
guided, first and foremost, by a common mission 
to serve the poorest in the rural areas. All three 
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institutions also claim to have clear, strict, and 
well-enforced poverty-based eligibility rules. If 
this is the case, these institutions should be target-
ing locations with above-average poverty levels.  
2. Expected level of demand for credit sevice . This 
consideration is important for two reasons. First, 
fixed costs associated with branch establishment 
imply that when demand is lower than some mini-
mum threshold level, credit dlivery becomes pro-
hibitively costly to administer. Second, the 
marginal impact of financial services on partici-
pating households is likely to be highest in areas 
with strongest credit demand. For these reasons, 
branch and service placement decisions are likely 
to respond to the level of physical and market 
infrastructure and the gen ral economic buoyancy 
of the area, all of which fuel credit demand. 
3. Cost of supplying services. While per-unit costs of 
supplying services are important, the underlying 
relationship is not as clear- ut as it is in profit-
seeking institutions because of the various types of 
subsidies received. Nonetheless, there are at least 
three related considerations. First, credit trans-
actions raise security concerns, and proximity to 
police stations or other law-enforcement establish-
ments is important. Proximity to branches of com-
mercial banks (which tend to locate in urban 
areas) is also important, since the NGOs do not 
provide banking services. Third, to the extent that 
salaries and other compensations do not reward 
appointments in more remote locations, managers 
are likely to prefer locations that have fairly well-
developed services (education, market, health). If 
these considerations are significant in the dcision 
to place branches, placement will be higher in 
thanas that have such services. 
4. Perceived risk. Maintaining high repayment rates 
is of utmost importance to all three institutions in 
securing continued access to donor grants and 
subsidies, and they are thus likely to avoid areas 
where marginal returns from new microenterprises 
are low enough to affect repayment rates. They are 
also likely to avoid areas that are highly sus-
ceptible to natural disasters such as flooding and 
other covariate risks. Some tension between 
poverty-targeting and financial performance is 
thus likely. 
 
 
 
Results indicate that even though the placem nt of 
branches of NGO institutions were attentive to poverty 
considerations, branches were nevertheless more likely
to be established in locations with better access to 
transport and communication infrastructure. Hence it 
appears that NGO services are geared more toward the 
poor who reside in relatively well-deve oped areas 
rather than the poor in more remote and less developed
regions. Client density of existing branches, however, 
did not exhibit such a featur  and actually tended to be 
better in less favorable and more “distressed” 
locations. 
Greater concentration of branches in more develop d 
areas may in part be becaus  in these locations, the 
marginal impact of credit services is the greatest. For 
example, loans for financing production of highly 
market-dependent outp ts, e.g., commercial crops and 
other nonfarm microenterprises, are less suitable for 
remote areas. Moreover, banking services become 
especially risky in remote areas where covariance in 
household incomes is likely to be very high. In such 
areas, the high repayment rates necessary to maintain 
NGOs’ access to donor funding are harder to achiev . 
Furthermore, the unavailabiity of commercial banks 
limits financial operations in remote or poor lcations. 
Hence, NGOs may follow a strategy of placing fewer 
b anches in distressed areas, but with each of these 
branches serving a larger number of clients. The 
tension between poverty targeting and ensuring 
adequate financial performance is thus quite evident in 
the way the NGOs place their services geographically. 
 
 
 
If efforts to simultaneously reach the poor, maximize 
marginal impact of services, and keep loan rayment 
rates high introduce considerable tension in service 
placement decisions, solutions for reducing this 
tension may lie in innovative lending technologies that 
reduce transaction costs to both lenders and borrowers 
and increase marginal returns of loans to the poor in 
disavantaged locations. Three specific recommenda-
tions are suggested: (1) set in place an institutional 
m chanism that provides fredom and incentive for 
front-line managers (rather than headquarters staff) to 
assess market potential and constraints and identify, 
design, and price services accordingly; (2) create addi-
tional incentives for NGOs to locate branches in 
remote areas where access to basic social services and 
economic infrastructure is lacking; and (3) introduce 
mobile banking, where remote locations are served by 
regional or district-level branches on a prescribed time 
sch dule.¾ 
 
 
 
Sharma, Manohar, and Manfred Zeller. 1999. 
Placement and Outreach of Group-Based Credit 
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The database compiled by IFPRI (see policy brief on 
microfinance institutions [MFIs] in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America) counts almost 1,500 microfinance 
institutions (688 in Indonesia and 790 in other countries) 
supported by international organizations n 85 developing 
countries. They reach 54 million members: 44 million of 
them save, and 23 million of them borrow. The total 
volume of outstanding credit stands at $18 billion and the 
total savings volume stands at $13 billion, or 72 percent 
of the volume of the outstanding loans. MFIs operated out 
of at least 46,000 branches and employed around 175,000 
persons. Analyzing this world of mushrooming MFIs can 
provide fresh insights on potential service outreach and 
the overall role of MFIs in developing countries. 
 
 
 
Lending Technologies 
 Four main types of lending technologies can be dis-
tinguished in terms membership, the role of savings, and 
the guarantees used for the loans. These are cooperatives, 
solidarity groups, village banks, and individual client-
based institutions. 
 The IFPRI database shows that when Indonesian MFIs 
are included, the individual client-based institutions pre-
dominate in number, followed by solidarity groups and 
cooperatives. Cooperatives and solidarity groups have 
about the same number of members. On the other hand 
solidarity groups have the largest number of borrowers, 
which reveals an active policy of lending for solidarity 
groups. The cooperative model dominates in loans and 
savings volume, followed by solidarity groups. 
 Indonesian individual-client based MFIs arenumerous 
but, except for the Bank Rakyat Indonesia, mostly repre-
sent small institutions at the village level. If these MFIs 
are excluded from the sample, then solidarity groups 
dominate in umber and in terms of borrowers, while 
cooperatives dominate in terms of volume of savings 
mobilized and loans disbursed. Village banks account for 
a significant number of MFIs and branches and for 12.5 
percent of members but remain small in terms of volume. 
Size and Share of Market 
 MFIs are also quite diverse in terms of size: 49 percent 
of MFIs have fewer than 2,500 members, 73 percent have 
10,000 members or fewer, and only 7.5 percent have 
more than 100,000 members, which represents an im-
presive world of tiny institutions. This diversity is due to 
the fact that competition is uneven; donors and govern-
ments subsidize institutions of various sizes (with small 
MFIs receiving relatively larger shares of subsidies in 
rela ion to their costs). Also, market segments in which 
they operate differ in terms of products and clientele, and 
small MFIs entering new market segments, such as rural 
are s or rural poor, have higher startup costs. The combi-
nation of these factors results in a financial system with a 
multitude of institution types but a concentration of 
activity at the top. According to IFPRI’s database (for 
MFIs in which the number of members is known), 3 
percent of the MFIs (the 18 largest ones) account for 80 
percent of the clients. 
 
Legal Status 
 In terms of their legal status, MFIs generally take one 
of the following forms: projects, nongovernmental 
organizations, cooperatives, or banks. Table 1 shows that 
91.5 percent of MFIs, with more than 100,000 members,
are regulated under cooperative law or banking law, while 
the same is true for only 16 percent of MFIs with fewer 
than 20,000 members. Although around 60 percent of 
MFIs are still unregulated, they account for less than 2 
percent of the volume of saving mobilized and loans dis- 
 
Table 1. Regulation status of MFIs, by number of 
members 
 Size of MFI, by number of members 
Status of regulation 0-20,000 
20,000- 
100,000 >100,000 Total 
     Regulated—cooperative, bank 
 (percent) 
 
 15.8 
 
 51.6 
 
 91.5 
 
 24.6 
Unregulated—nongovernmental  
  organization, project (percent) 
 69.0  35.5  8.5  61.4 
Not available (percent)  15.2  12.9  0  14.0 
Number total of MFIs  538  62  47  650 
Source: IFPRI survey on worldwide MFIs, 1999. 
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bursed. More than 95 percent of the volume of micro-
finance transactions flows through regulated institutions. 
 
 
 
Breadth and Depth of Outreach 
The extreme concentration of activity among the 
largest MFIs underscores the current difficulty in signifi-
cantly and rapidly increasing MFIs’ breadth of outreach. 
MFIs must be supported and innovation must be used so 
that they can reach a significant scale in terms of the 
number of clients and the volume of activity. 
Efficiency in depth of outreach can come from three 
main strategies. First, some hug  institutions, such as t e 
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives in 
Thailand or the Bank Rakyat Indonesia, have an 
impressive breadth of outreach. They may only have a 
low percentage of poor among their clients, but on the 
whole, they can reach more poor households compared 
with tiny nongovernmental organizations that struggle to 
target specifically the poorest but that have no means to 
grow in scale. Second, some solid, self-sufficient institu-
tions, which first concentrate their efforts on ins itution 
building and financial autonomy, can develop, in a second 
step, direct services or links for reaching the poor. Final-
ly, some institutions clearly focus their services on the 
poor. They target actively and rely on specific organiza-
tions to compensate for the specific costs and constraints 
faced in reaching the poor: e.g., village banks or solidarity 
groups delegate part of the screening and monitoring 
process to clients and use new forms of guarantees to 
lower costs. This last category of MFIs generally grows 
more slowly and takes more time to reach self-
sufficiency. 
 
Regulation 
The necessity for regulating microfinance is based on 
several arguments. The protection of savers is generally 
the first argument. To implement efficient intermediation, 
MFIs will also have to leverage capital and mobilize 
external resources. This requires them to formalize their 
activities and to follow standard financial rules to gain the 
confidence of other financial institutions. Finally, MFIs 
may find that official recognition gives them a competi-
tive edge over informal competitors. 
Even if it is generally accepted now that specific regu-
lations can be defined for MFIs, the debate continues on 
which MFIs should be regulated. All tiny MFIs clearly 
cannot be regulated and supervised. Moreover, many 
large MFIs are already regulated. The question of regula-
tion is importantly linked to the change of scale of some 
nongovernmental organizations that will have to grow 
larger to serve more clients. 
 
Innovation 
The IFPRI worldwide survey underscored the MFI 
industry’s progress in overcoming many constraints. 
How ver, innovations are still necessary to further im-
prove outreach, to reach sustainability more rapidly, and 
to expand the provision of sustainable financial services 
i  areas where little progress has been made. These areas 
are smallholder agriculture, credit for agribusiness, and 
insurance (such as old age, disability, unemployment, and 
h alth). 
 
Support for MFIs 
Given the current structure of the financial systems 
with a large number of tiny MFIs, and given the need for 
inn vations, two types of MFIs should be supported in the 
financial landscape: those for profit and those that have a 
social ambition. Their characteristics are outlined in 
Table 2. 
 Of course, the world of microfinance is not strictly 
divided between these two types; indeed, a range of 
situations falls between these extremes. Further, a dy-
namic must be encouraged so that small MFIs can grow 
and serve more clients. However, both types should be 
encouraged, as each fulfills a specific role in the outreach 
and innovation generation. In particular, they nourish 
each other in terms of innovation: small organizations an 
benefit from the information on regulation and best 
practices to improve their performance and governance; 
large organizations can draw on the pool of innovations 
bearing on breadth and depth of outreach t sted by 
smaller nongovernmental organizations. The diversity of 
the world of MFIs must be seen as an asset and not 
necessarily the result of inefficient support.¾ 
 
 
Table 2. Main characteristics of the two types of MFIs 
MFI characteristic For-profit MFIs Nonprofit MFIs 
Size Large Small 
Regulation Formal financial institution (bank, cooperative) Unregulated status (project, nongovernmental 
organization) 
Main objective Financial self-sufficiency, breadth of outreach Impact on the poor, innovation, depth of outreach 
Main means Application of well-known best practices Search and test of innovations 
 Professional and efficient functioning Professional and efficient functioning 
 Incentive structures for staff and clients Incentive structures for staff and clients 
Lending technology Mainly individual approach and cooperative Solidarity groups, village banks, linkage, 
innovative technologies 
Financial activities Full-fledged financial services (credit, savings, 
insurance) 
Most begin with credit, some with savings 
Complementary services None, or minimalist approach Possible (training, social services) 
Sources of funds Savings, interbank loans Concessionary loans 
Dependence on 
subsidies 
Maybe in the short run, rapidly declining In the medium term, slowly declining 
Self-sufficiency Rapidly reached (few years) Slowly reached (can be 5 to 10 years or more) 
Incentive Profit Donor or sponsor-driven: national orinternational 
recognition, concessionary funding, evolution 
towards more autonomy 
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How many microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
exist in the developing world? How well are 
they performing? What is their role in house-
hold economies? Are they using their funds 
efficiently? In 1999, the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) conducted a 
survey on MFIs in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America to offer a new in-depth analysis of the 
distribution and performances of MFIs at the 
international level. This brief summarizes the 
results of the survey. 
 
 
 
 IFPRI systematically sampled data on MFIs 
obtained through international nongovernment-
al organizations and other networks supporting 
these institutions. The survey adopted an aver-
age loan size of US$1,000 as the ceiling in de-
fining MFIs. Information from the survey was 
complemented by a review of publications and 
technical manuals on microfinance. Geograph-
ically, the information concerns Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America, but the richest countries in 
Asia (those with per capita gross domestic 
products (GDPs) exceeding US$5,000) have 
been excluded. All of the selected MFIs receive 
some form of inter-national support, either 
through funding, technical assistance, or infor-
mation dissemination. This mode of sampling 
underestimates local initiatives and national 
programs, but it does offer an overview of the 
role of the donors in the development of the 
MFIs. Data are all self-reported; however, as 
the information comes from supporting insti-
tutions, it is expected that this data have under-
gone some minimal amount of scrutiny and 
checking. 
 Table 1 summarizes the information com-
puted from the database obtained. 
 
Table 1. Overview of the volume of activities 
of MFIs in the developing world, 1999 
Measure Total 
Countries 85 
MFIs recorded in the sample 1,478 
MFIs with data 1,366 
Local branches established 45,958 
Staff 175,067 
Borrowers 23,542,955 
Savers 43,929,072 
Members 54,050,639 
Savings US$12,269,966,267 
Outstanding loans US$17,452,192,521 
Source: IFPRI surveys on worldwide MFIs, 1999. 
 
 
 
 
 This database of MFIs from 85 developing 
countries shows 1,478 institutions (688 in Indo-
nesia and 790 in other countries) supported by 
international organizations. They reach 54 mil-
lion members, 44 million savers (voluntary and 
compulsory savings), and round 23 million 
b rrowers. The total volume of outstanding 
loans is US$18 billion. The total savings vol-
ume is US$12 billion, or 68 percent of the 
volume of the outstanding loans. MFIs have 
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developed around 46,000 branches and employ 
around 175,000 persons.  
A range of microfinance models is in use. 
Latin America and East Asia are particularly 
well served. Among the large countries with no 
MFI or low outreach (less than 0.1 percent of 
the population) are those affected by internal 
conflicts, such as Algeria, Somalia, Angola, or 
Afghanistan; or countries receiving low interna-
tional support for political reasons, such as 
Cuba, North Korea, or Iraq. Data are indicative 
that a minimum of political and economic 
stability is required for MFIs to develop. 
 
 
 
 
 MFIs are diverse in terms of technology and 
legal status and, as observed in previous sur-
veys, are highly concentrated in size. MFIs 
have been classified into five major types ac-
cording to the main technology they use to 
provide financial services: cooperatives, soli-
darity groups, village banks, individual 
contracts, and linkage banking. Cooperatives 
are responsible for the largest proportion of the 
credit volume and savings transactions, while 
solidarity groups score high in terms of number 
of borrowers. The village-bank and linkage 
models, thanks to the delegation of supervision 
to local voluntary staff, record higher staff 
productivity and achieve better depth of out-
reach than other MFIs. In terms of regulation 
and legal status, more than 95 percent of the 
volume of microfinance transactions flows 
through regulated institutions. Banks, which are 
subject to prudential laws, record the highest 
repayment rates and staff productivity. Non-
governmental organizations cater to  specific 
clientele and record good repayment and depth 
of outreach, but low staff productivity. 
 
 
 
 Asia is tops in terms of volume of MFI activ-
ities, with 70 percent of the institutions, 77 
percent of the members, 55 percent of the sav-
ings volume, and 65 percent of the loan vol-
ume. However, when Indonesia is excluded, 
Africa compares well in terms of number of 
MFIs (45 percent). The number of MFIs and 
the number of their clients remain more modest 
in Latin America compared with Asia. How-
ever, MFIs mobilize an impressive amount of 
savings and distribute a significant amount of 
loans in Latin America. The largest loan trans-
ctions take place in Latin America (US$418) 
and the smallest in Asia (US$153), but in terms 
of percentage of per capita GDP, Africa has the 
largest transactions (82 percent of GDP com-
pared with 33 percent and 35 percent for Latin 
America and Asia, respectively). In fact, the 
large volume of loans as a percentage of per 
capita GDP in Africa could be partly due to the 
predominance of cooperatives, which reach a 
wealthier population. In Asia, solidarity groups 
dominate, while village banks are largely repre-
sented in Latin America. 
In terms of performance, African MFIs have 
the lowest repayment rates. Asia, on the other 
hand, benefits from good repayment rates. 
However, Asian productivity is quite low, both 
in terms of number of clients and volume 
transactions per staff compared with both 
Africa and Latin America. Surprisingly, staff 
pr ductivity in terms of number of clients is the 
same in Latin America as in Africa, where 
problems arising out of inadequate infras ruc-
ture and low population density are more 
severe. However, employees in Latin America 
have loan portfolios three times larger than 
their African counterparts. Greatest women 
focus is recorded in Latin America, where 54 
percent of MFI members are women, whereas 
African and Asian MFIs have less than 50 per-
cent women as members. 
The IFPRI database on MFIs underlines the 
presence of a multitude of MFIs that, except in 
unstable countries, are widespread, with no 
regions completely by-passed. They offer small 
financial services to 54 million households and 
savings mobilization plays a major role. MFIs 
ar  diverse in terms of lending technologies and 
legal status. But scope for better outreach 
exists, and each type of institution could be 
strengthened by increasing its size and 
productivity.¾ 
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For poor rural families in developing countries, access to 
credit and savings facilities has the potential to make the 
difference between grinding poverty and an economically 
secure life. Well-managed savings facilities permit house-
holds to build up funds for future investment or con-
sumption. Credit enables them to tap finances beyond 
their own resources and to take advantage of profitable 
investment opportunities. Credit and savings also serve as 
insurance for the poor. In rural areas of developing 
countries, short-term loans or past savings are often used 
to provide basic necessities when household incomes 
decline temporarily—after a bad harvest or between agri-
cultural seasons, for example. 
 But in most developing countries, rural financial 
services are sadly inadequate. Those who want to borrow 
from the formal sector are usually deterred by the strict 
collateral requirements and high transaction costs in-
volved in doing business with formal institutions. Many 
potential borrowers are in such need of cr dit that they are 
willing to pay substantially higher interest rates in the 
informal markets—sometimes as high as 80 percent per 
year. But the amount of credit available through informal 
markets is often constrained by bottlenecks in the local 
supply of funds.  
 The story on the savings side is similar. Costs involved 
in managing small deposits at faraway banks are high, 
discouraging farmers and rural entrepreneurs from mak-
ing a series of tiny deposits, as they prefer to do. Many of 
the rural financial institutions choose not to accept de-
posits; others are legally forbidden to do so to protect 
depositors from fraud and for other reasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 As important as rural finances are, the task of providing 
credit and saving opportunities at a reasonable cost to 
those who have only meager assets ha  been neither 
straightforward nor easy. Until the 1980s, in many de-
veloping countries, state-run agricultural development 
banks—armed with subsidized funds and eloquent pro-
poor directives—took the lead in establishing formal 
credit markets in rural a eas. However, the shortcomings 
of the institutional principles they were based on—
collateralized lending, an organizational setup without 
any incentives to do business with the poor, and pervasive 
political patronage—s verely handicapped their perfor-
mance. Not only did they fail to serve the poor who could 
not pledge collateral, their inefficiency made them so 
dependent on state subsidies that they became financially 
unsustainable. Since then, support for state-sponsor d 
agricultural banks has greatly dcline , and the need for 
financial market reforms to rectify distortions caused by 
past policies is almost universally acknowledged.  
 Now, the most basic roles of government—establishing 
macroeconomic stability, ensuring that financial markets 
are free to respond to economic incentives while follow-
ing sound banking practices, and maintaining and 
enforcing a legal framework that ensures contract 
compliance—are beyond dispute. However, these actions 
alone cannot trigger development of rural financial 
institutions that serve the poor. This is because rural 
financial markets have inherent problems that make 
investments risky as well as costly, and formal financial 
institutions have been unable to devise profitable savings 
and loan services for the rural poor. Inf rmation about 
potential borrowers, especially in far-flung areas, is 
difficult to obtain, making loan applications excessively 
costly to evalu te, especially when loans are small. The 
p or also own few assets, making it infeasible for the 
financial institution to secure its lending with collateral. 
As a result, private investors either shy away from the 
financial sector or limit their services within the urban 
economy, where information on prospective borrowers is 
less costly to obtain. 
This is not to say that private-sec or banks will not have 
a role in the rural financial sector in the future. Many 
untries initiated serious financial reforms only in the 
second half of the 1980s. Therefore, it is too early to con-
clu  that private banks, which are just now establishing 
themselves in urban areas, will not gradually expand their 
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services to rural areas as these become more developed 
and prosperous. 
Lenders in informal markets do provide loans to the 
poor. In all these countries, informal lenders make loans 
without collateral, using various techniques for screening 
applicants and enforcing repayment. Households or even 
small communities may enter i o mutually beneficial 
risk-pooling schemes; traders disburse credit to farmers in 
exchange for the right to market the growing crop; 
shopkeepers increase sales by providing credit for food, 
farm inputs, and household necessities; and large 
landholders secure access to labor in the peak season in 
return for earlier loan advances to laborers. In many 
countries informal credit and savings associations play an 
important role in the provision of financial services. In 
fact, the ingenuity of informal lenders and self-help 
organizations in tailoring loan products to the require-
ments of their clients or members makes them indis-
pensable in both the urban and rural financial landscape 
of developing countries. 
 But innovative and useful as the informal sector may 
be, it frequently runs up against severe constraints. 
Informal credit markets, by their very nature, are 
segmented. A "market" typically consists of a single 
village community. And informal lenders seldom manage 
savings deposits. Hence, financial intermediation in the 
sense of providing a common clearinghouse for 
borrowers and lenders does not take place to the fullest 
extent possible. As a result, the supply of credit is limited, 
resulting in either severe credit rationing or extremely 
high interest rates for some lenders. Also, especially in 
agricultural regions, risks arising out of droughts or 
floods affect both informal lenders and borrowers 
simultaneously, so a credit supply crunch is likely to take 
place just when the demand for credit peaks. 
 Overall, it is clear that the task of delivering financial 
services to the rural poor cannot be left entirely to market 
forces. 
  
 
 
 
 Successful financial outreach to the rural poor requires 
institutional innovations that reduce the risks and costs of 
lending small amounts of money. So far, most innova-
tions in microfinance have come from nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) that do not have commercial profit 
as their principal objective. By taking fresh approaches, 
these new microfinance institutions have penetrated rural 
financial markets and serviced an underclass of borrowers 
in a way that was unimaginable some 20 years ago.
 Far from being one-shot transfers, loans from such 
institutions have helped poor families make permanent 
positive changes in the quality of their lives. Of course, 
lack of capital is only one factor keeping poor rural 
households from improving their welfare. In rural areas of 
developing countries, illiteracy is high, basic social and 
market infrastructure is lacking, and many people are in 
poor health. When seed or irrigation water for the farmer, 
market access for the rural producer, or elementary 
bookkeeping skills for the would-be entrepreneur are 
absent, the returns to financial services will be low or 
sometimes even wasted. 
 
 
 
 
 One important lesson that is becoming increasingly 
clear: there is no single institutional blueprint for success. 
Recent experience with institutional innovations has 
shown that programs must be designed to harness a 
community's particular strengths in orderto re uce costs 
of screening participants, monitoring financial activity, 
and enforcing contractual obligations. The group-based 
system has worked well in Bangladesh, whereas several 
programs in Indonesia successfully use local agents to 
assess borrowers' c editworthiness. 
 Designing, experimenting with, and building financial 
institutions for the poor require economic resources and 
adequate consideration of longer-term social returns. In 
the last two decades, NGOs have taken the lead partly 
because the support they receive from donors and 
government organizations make it feasible for them to 
invest in innovations. Just as public policy should play a 
ole in promoting technological innovations that generate 
social benefits, it should also help promote institutional 
innovations that assist the disadvantaged or address 
intrinsic market failures. As policymakers seek to make 
rational policy choices, they must weigh the social costs 
of designing and building financial institutions for the 
po against their social benefits. Of course, some 
experiments in institutional innovations will succeed, 
whil  others will fail. Public policy will need to support 
and evaluate this experimentation process and nurture 
those designs or institutions that hold promise of future 
success. Governments, donors, practitioners, and research 
institutions must work together closely to pinpoint the 
costs, benefits, and future potential of emerging financial 
institutions. 
 In the long run, the payoff to public investment in 
institutional innovations will lie in the transformation of 
now nascent microfinance institutions into full-fledged, 
financial intermediaries that offer savings and credit 
services to smallholders, tenant farmers, and rural 
entrepreneurs, thus alleviating poverty. Evidence of this 
transformation is already emerging in countries such as 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Thailand. The payoff will 
al o come from the development of viable lending 
methodologies that private commercial banks can readily 
adopt to profitably provide saving  and loan services to 
the poor. This is already happening in some parts of the 
world: in urban Latin America, for example, private 
commercial banks have started to adopt group-based 
lending methods developed and tested by nonprofit 
organizations that ini ially depended on public support. 
With the right combination of public policy, private 
initiative, and objective research, public investments in 
financial institutions designed to serve the poor in other 
rural areas of Africa, Asia, and Latin America will be r 
fruit as well.¾ 
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POLICY BRIEF No 8   •   JULY  2000 
In most developing countries, it is the private, 
informal markets that the rural poor have 
traditionally turned to service their financial 
needs. Why have these institutions succeeded in 
providing services to the poor when formal insti-
tutions have not? Do these informal institutions 
provide any lessons that bigger formal institutions 
could use? What are their basic limitations? An-
swers to such questions indicate important direc-
tions for public policy. 
 Typically, institutions can be categorized as fol-
lows: 
1. Lending and borrowing among rela-
tives, neighbors, and friends. Borrowing from 
socially close lenders is often the first recourse 
that poor households have in financing expenses, 
especially those related to essential consumption 
expenditure. Transactions are collateral-f ee and 
in most cases interest is not charged. These are 
essentially informal social insurance schemes that 
have the principle of reciprocity at the core of 
transactions. Hence, both the lender and the bor-
rower gain from the transaction, and the process 
is self-sustaining. The borrower is able to finance 
urgently needed expenditures quickly and with 
little transactions costs: there is no lengthy ap-
praisal process involved, little or no paperwork or 
travel time is involved, and the terms of trans-
actions are well understood. The lender gains a 
right to reciprocity that he can lay claim to in the 
future. Further, risk of loan recovery is at a 
minimum since the lender only lends to persons 
who are part of his or her social network, within 
which contracts can be enforced. For each 
partner, therefore, the long-term gains associated 
with maintaining borrowing privilege is greater 
than the short-term gain of reneging on the 
p yback. 
2. The rotating credit and saving associ-
ations (ROSCAs) found in many countries are 
also network-based but address different needs of 
its members and the rules of conduct are more 
formalized. These associations, which may even 
operate under a designated manager, pool in sav-
ings from members each period and rotate the 
resulting pot among them using various rules. The 
process is repeated each period until the last 
member receives the pot. Because of the rotating 
rules, these schemes are less suited to address 
household risk unless the timing of the receipt 
coincides with unexpected events. Also, unlike 
demand deposits, once the saving is committed, it 
cannot be drawn immediately and the member is 
required to wait her turn.. The main goal of a 
ROSCA is to mobilize savings and channel this to 
borrowers in some prespecified order, and thus 
fulfill an important intermediation function.  
3. Informal moneylenders. Typically, in-
formal moneylenders are approached when the 
amount of credit required is larger than can be 
obtained from friends and neighbors. Moneylend-
ers charge explicit interest rates in order to obtain 
real positive returns on their capital. In fact, inter-
est rates are usually high and rates in the range of 
5-7 percent per month are not uncommon. 
Typically, moneylenders lend only to households 
bout whom they possesses enough information. 
However, they may also lend to others about 
whom they possess less information if pu itive 
actions on those that default are feasible.In com-
munities in which they are acc ptable, lending 
may be  either explicitly  secured by collateral, or
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upon a community-wide understanding that 
allows the lender to resort to punitive action when 
contracts are breached. The informal nature of 
these transactions must be noted: these sanctions 
are enforced not by any legal authority but by the 
commonly understood rules of the communities 
themselves. Of course, this may not be feasible in 
all communities.  
4. Tied Credit. Credit transactions are fre-
quently tied with transactions in land and labor 
markets to circumvent problems of inadequate 
information and lack of collateral suitable assets. 
Thus, traders disburse credit to farmers in ex-
change for the right to market the growing crop; 
shopkeepers increase sales by providing credit for 
food, farm inputs, and household necessities; 
large landholders secure access to labor in the 
peak season in return for earlier loan advances to 
laborers. The important feature of these types of 
transactions is that the lender also deals with the 
borrower in a nonlending capacity and is able to 
use this position to screen applicants and enforce 
contracts. 
 
 
 
 A number of important lessons can be learned 
from the informal systems described above. 
1.  Credible long-term partnership. The 
belief that the accumulated benefits associated 
with continued long-term transactions are larger 
than short-term gains associated with delinquent 
behavior is what propels self-enforceability of 
most informal institutions. Formal institutions 
therefore also need to successfully demonstrate to 
clients in small rural communities that they are 
not transitory phenomena and that it is worth-
while for them to invest in a long-term, profitable 
relationship. This demonstration is essential for 
maintaining high repayment rates. Short-term and 
sporadically implemented "credit projects" gener-
ally encounter higher rates of loan delinquency 
precisely because short-run gains associated with 
default outweigh extremely uncertain future 
gains. 
2. Tailoring financial services to specific 
demand patterns. As with the marketing of any 
products, financial services need to be finely 
sculpted to specific demand patterns of the bor-
rowers. For the poor, borrowing privilege in 
various informal institutions is worth preserving 
precisely because their services are very respon-
sive to specific conditions of households. Emer-
gency loans, for example, are obtainable im-
mediately on demand, repayment structure is 
closely linked to local production cycles associ-
ated with the borrower's occupation, and loans are 
ren gotiated, taking into account both lender's and 
borr wer's specific circumstances. These attri-
butes greatly increase the utility of loans t  bor-
rowers and provide further incentive for them to 
re ain borrowing privileges. On the contrary, 
when loans terms are incompatible with local pro-
duction patterns or when loans are tied to 
activities that, given the structure of local re-
sources, yield poor returns, very little is gai ed by 
ret ining borrowing privileges. Benefits from de-
faulting in such cases may outweigh retaining 
borrowing privileges. 
3. Knowledge of local economy is im-
portant; therefore, so is decentralization of 
decision-making. The ways in which financial 
transactions are interlinked with transactions in 
the market for land, produce, and labor by in-
formal agents indicate the potential for making 
such types of innovations in the formal sector. 
This requires intimate knowledge of the structure 
of local economy as well as of local institutional 
arrangements that may be used to trengthen fi-
nancial links between the borrower and the 
lender. Generally this is not possible within a top-
down organizational framework; what is needed 
is the active involvement of front-line managers 
who can design financial products that take full
account of local institutions and local resource 
endowments. 
4. Not all financial contracts are self-en-
forcing and adequate steps must be taken to 
enforce contract compliance. The majority of 
informal financial contracts between friends and 
relatives are of a self-enforcing nature, but social-
l  distant lenders depend a lot on external, though 
n t necessarily legally codified, mechanisms to 
enforce repayments. Just as moneylenders win the 
mandate of small communities to take punitive 
actions against defaulters, it is also important for 
formal institutions to have clear and imple-
mentable plans for contract enforcement and loan 
recovery before lending begins. Lack of a credible 
plan will only invite greater rates of default.¾ 
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Lending is a risky enterprise because repayment of 
loans can seldom be fully guaranteed. The failure of a 
large number of state-sponsored agricultural develop-
ment banks in many developing countries was due, 
among other things, to their inability to ensure good 
repayment rates among their borrowers. In the context 
of providing credit to the rural asset-poor, what is 
being increasingly called for is institutional innovation 
that combines prudent banking principles with effect-
tive screening and monitoring strategies that are not 
based on physical collateral (such as land). One im-
portant innovation has been the formation of borrower 
groups and the use of group responsibility and peer 
monitoring as the core principles guiding financial 
transactions. The success story of Bangladesh's Gra-
meen Bank’s using small groups of borrowers in ser-
vicing the poor and achieving high rates of repayment 
is now well known. So are the experiences of SANSA 
in Sri Lanka and Credit Solidaire in Burkina Faso. In 
Thailand, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives achieved high repayment rates even 
though it sometimes uses groups consisting of as many 
as 30 members. However, repayment rates are not uni-
formly high for all institutions or across groups within 
an insti ution. In Nepal, the repayment performance of 
groups formed under the Small Farmers Development 
Program (SFDP) exhibits a very mixed result. Exam-
ples from other countries show how repayment rates of 
groups can fluctuate according to changing external 
circumstances. 
 What important factors affect group repayment rates 
within these new financial institutions? What are fac-
tors that managers of microfinance should consider 
when initiating group formation? These are important 
issues for emerging microfinance institutions since 
even small amounts of loan losses can weaken a 
microfinance institution very quickly. IFPRI studies in 
Bangladesh and Madagascar address these issues. The 
results of these studies are summarized below. 
 
 
 Group size matters. The bigger the group, the more 
imperfect are flows of information likely to be between 
members, and repayment can falter because of poorer 
scre ning and monitoring. 
 Loan amount. Generally the bigger the loan 
am unt, the more difficult it is to meet repayment obli-
gations in the event of project failure. Hence, unwilling 
default is likely to increase. 
 Group’s portfolio diversity. The greater the 
diversity of asset portfolio within group members, the 
less covariant the incomes within the group. This 
makes it easier fo  one member to bail out another 
member who is experiencing repayment difficulties. 
 Level of credit rationing. The higher the level of 
credit rationing imposed on the group, the higher level 
of the group’s unfulfilled credit demand. If this 
ge erates a greater concern for protecting future bor-
rowing privileges, groups can be expected to increase 
efforts to lower delinquency rates. However, if the 
degree of rationing is too high, it is likely to render the 
l an amount more and more trivial (in comparison to 
the eeds of the groups), so that the lender may not be 
anymore considered as a preferred long-term partner. 
Hence, too much of rationing is likely to decrease in-
centives to adhere to the contracted repayment 
schedule.  
 Social interrelatedness within groups. Since infor-
mation flows are expected to be better within socially 
conn cted groups made up of friends and relatives, 
there would be less moral hazard associated with bail-
ing out a relative who is unable to meet the repayment 
requirements. However, cultural factors may turn im-
portant as when it becomes socially difficult to impose 
sa ctions on relatives, and in this way dilute the 
enforcement process. For precisely this reason, to also 
prevent possible collusion, some credit programs have 
rules against groups consisting of close relatives. 
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 Demographic composition of group. Frequently, 
households with a greater number of nonworking chil-
dren and other dependents are perceived to be less 
creditworthy. Results indicate that this is not so: re-
payment rates in Bangladesh are better among groups 
made of households with more dependents. Indeed, it 
is likely that such households are more risk averse 
since the consequence of adverse shocks is likely to be 
more serious as it affects children and elders who are 
more vulnerable. Such risk-averse households would 
seek to avoid reduced borrowing privileges, or reduced 
access to special emergency funds in the future. Hence, 
they make special efforts to fulfill repayment obli-
gations. 
 Gender composition of groups. Findings in Bang-
ladesh show that repayment rates are higher for groups 
that have a higher percentage of women. Two factors 
may be at work. First, given that women have very 
limited experience in the market economy to begin 
with, they are extremely cautious in their business 
ventures and are likely to choose projects that are 
relatively less risky. Second, the cost of project failure 
is likely to be higher for females than for males, given 
pervasive gender inequities: project failure may lead to 
reprimand and significant negative sanctions against 
the woman within the household, and she takes 
account of this eventuality in her decisionmaking. 
Hence, women are not only likely to seect less risky 
projects, they are also more careful about fulfilling 
repayment obligations. 
 Group formation. It is likely that screening and 
monitoring are more effective within groups that form 
on their own than within those groups that depend on 
the intervention of an outside agent. This leads to 
better repayment rates, except in cases when indi-
viduals collude to form groups with the express intent 
to default. 
 Community characteristics. The less remote and 
more buoyant the local economy, the better the marke  
opportunities are for profitable enterprise. Hence re-
payment rates are better in such communities. How-
ever, IFPRI research indicates that this is not always 
so: in Bangladesh, remote communities had better 
repayment rates. The more remote the village, the 
greater the value placed on institutional credit services 
since other alternatives are less available (e.g., loans 
from traders, employers); delinquency rates therefore 
are low to avoid a loss of future borrowing privileges 
from this important, d sometimes only, source. 
 
 
 
Overall, results indicate that once the right institu-
tional structures are in place, there need not be a major 
conflict between prudent financial management and 
lending to the asset poor. Repayment rates can be good 
even in relatively remote communities with higher 
than average rates of poverty. The secret seems to lie 
not just in innovations that reduce the cost of 
screening, monitoring, and enforcing loan contracts, 
but also in the successful demonstration to transactors 
in small rural communities that these innovations and 
institutions are not transitory phenomena, that they 
address their financial concerns, and that it is 
worthwhile for them to invest in a profitable long-term 
association. In fact, it is precisely this type of realiza-
tion among borrowers that has contributed to the 
building up of a critical mass of social capital that 
supports successful group-based institutions. Without 
this critical mass, joint liability would quickly floun-
der. Understanding the financial concerns of the poor 
is therefore indispensable; after all, there is little 
incentive for borrowers to build a lasting relat onship 
with institutions that do not address their eco omic 
demand.  
 It is suggested that the process of group formation 
be made more endogenous to members themselves and 
less subject to external rules. IFPRI research indicates 
that factors such as asset and enterprise diversity 
within groups significantly affect repayment rates. A 
good mix of income activities, including agricultural 
production activities, is thus a desirable group char-
cte istic. In general, potential members are in a better 
position to screen and select the best partners for group 
formation, giving due consideration to factors such as 
potential risk-pooling benefits by co-selecting 
members whose anticipated income and consumption 
shocks are negatively correlated. 
 Finally, the experience of group lending shows that 
the basic principles of prudential banking have to be 
adhered to at all times. Delivering finance to the poor 
should not be taken to mean that loan evaluation or 
rationing should be entirely dispensed. On the con-
trary, loan size has to take into consideration in-
vestment capacities and the risk-bearing abilities of the 
rural poor. In fact, our analysis indicated that delin-
quency rates do appear to increase with loan size. 
Hence, objective and realistic project evaluation is 
necessary prior to loan approval. In case graduated 
lending is considered, increases in credit lines should 
be granted only after a careful scrutiny of project risks 
and conditional upon satisfactory previous repayment 
performance. However, it is important to ensure that 
this evaluation of loan applications not be based on 
traditional forms of bias against gender, age or families 
with many children. As the results of our analysis 
indi ate, these biases, however deep-root d, are totally 
misplaced.¾ 
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POLICY BRIEF No 10   •   JULY  2000 
Many microfinance institutions (MFIs) receive public 
support. In return for this support, governments and 
donors demand MFIs not only become financially 
sustainable but also reach the poor, or even the poorest 
of the poor. Effective evaluation of the achievement of 
these objectives requires appraising both the MFI’s 
financial sustainability and the relative poverty of its 
clients. In recent years, several tools have emerged to 
assist donors in their assessment of the financial 
sustainability of MFIs. For example, the Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP), which seeks to 
promote sustainable microfinance institutions for the 
poor, disseminates a number of tools that allow 
assessing the financial sustainability and other aspects 
of institutional performance of MFIs. Currently, no 
operational tool exists for measuring how well a MFI 
reaches the poor through its services. In order to gain 
more transparency on the depth of poverty outreach, 
CGAP supported research at IFPRI during 1999 and 
2000 to design and test a simple, low-c st operational 
tool to measure the poverty level of MFI clients 
relative to nonclients. 
This policy brief summarizes the main features of 
the tool, how it can be applied, and what type of results 
can be obtained. Another policy brief informs about 
the results from four test country cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The poverty assessment (PA) tool developed under 
the collaborative project of IFPRI and CGAP comple-
ments an array of methods already available for assess-
ing various dimensions of the institutional performance 
of MFIs. A widely accepted method in poverty assess-
ment is to conduct a detailed household expenditure 
survey and to use household total expenditure as the 
primary measure to evaluate standard of living of 
households. Although detailed quantitative studies are 
fr quently regarded as accurate means of assessing 
poverty levels, the high cost of acquiring and ana-
lyzing such extensive information often precludes the 
methodology from being used for operational appli-
cations.
Therefore, the new PA tool responds to five specific 
design parameters set to accommodate microfinance 
industry needs: 
§ The tool is operationally straightforward.  
§ The cost of implementing the tool is relatively low.  
§ The timeframe for assessment is short.  
§ The tool specifically addresses poverty measurement 
in developing countries. 
§ The results are readily interpretable and comparable 
across programs and countries. 
 
 
 
 
Consideration of the above mentioned design param-
eters led to the adoption of an indicator-based poverty-
assessment method. This involved 
1. identifying a range of indicators that reflect power-
fully on poverty levels and for which credible 
information can be quickly and inexpensively 
obtained; 
2. designing a survey methodology that facilitates the 
collection of information on these indicators from 
households living in the operational area of 
the MFI. 
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The new tool can measure the poverty level of 
clients of microfinance institutions relative to 
nonclients at low costs. The tool may also be used 
for evaluating the poverty outreach of other types 
of development and safety net programs. 
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3. testing these indicators in diverse socioeconomic 
and cultural settings, and identifying those indi-
cators that are strongly related to relative poverty 
levels in each of the four country cases so as to 
reduce the number of questions for future applica-
tions of the tool; and
4. formulating a single summary index that combined 
information from a range of indicators and that 
could be used to make poverty comparisons be-
tween client and nonclient households. 
 Because of the multifaceted nature of poverty, 
reliance on any one indicator would not be adequate. 
To capture different dimensions of poverty, IFPRI 
used the following classification of indicators in the 
process of developing the generic household-lev l 
questionnaire: 
1. Indicators expressing the means available to house-
holds to increase their welfare. These reflect the 
earning potential and relate to  
· human capital (family size, education, occupa-
tion, etc.), 
· asset ownership, 
· social capital of household. 
2. Indicators related to the fulfilment of basic needs: 
· health status and access to health services, 
· access to food, shelter and clothing, 
· other dimensions of achievement of welfare 
(security, social status, environment) assess-
ments based on this experience. 
 From an exhaustive list of indicators derived 
through a literature review and expert consultation, the 
IFPRI team initially chose to include a smaller subset 
in a generic questionnaire that then was tested in four 
case study countries with diverse socioeconomic and 
cultural settings. In total, about 300 poverty indicators 
were contained in the questionnaire and tested in he 
four country case studies. 
 
 
 
 The tool prescribes how to collect household data on 
a range of poverty indicators through a standardized 
questionnaire. There are several reasons for identifying 
poverty indicators that are not specific to a particular
country or region, but rather are general in the sense 
that they can indicate the level of poverty irrespective 
of socioeconomic characteristics of the chosen coun-
tries or regions within countries. First, general indica-
tors allow within-country and across-country compar-
isons. Second, working from a standardized ques-
tionnaire avoids the risks of introducing error and 
eases the complex task of designing appropriate ques-
tions for creating indicators of poverty. However, com-
plete standardization is also impractical, given the 
inherently relative nature of poverty: the “poor” in a 
wealthy country may be considered “nonpoor” in an-
other country. Indicators must be such that they easily 
can be adjusted to different levels of absolute poverty. 
 Relative poverty levels of sampled households are 
measured by these indicators through calculation of a 
household poverty index. This index weighs the 
relative poverty of each household relative to all others 
and provides a ranking score. The mean of the score is 
zero, and its standard deviation is 1. The ranking score 
indicates how each household’s estimated poverty 
level compares with those of all other households sur-
veyed. The higher the score, the relatively less poor the 
household is. 
 To accommodate the needed flexibility in measuring 
poverty to fit each country situation, estimation of the 
poverty index itself demands for a flexible approach. 
In other words, each country requires a different mix 
of indicators to calculate the most meaningful mea-
surement of relative poverty for that country. For this 
reason, the statistical technique of principal compo-
nents analysis was used for determining which indi-
cators contribute the most to creating a poverty index 
for each  individual  country.  Specifically, PC analysis 
 
 
Figure 1. Indicators and underlying components 
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isolates and measures the poverty component em-
bedded in the various poverty indicators and creates a 
household-specific poverty score or index (Figure 1). 
PC analysis extracts underlying components from a set 
of information provided by summary indicators. In the 
case of this poverty assessment tool, information col-
lected from the questionnaires make up the “indica-
tors” and the underlying component that is isolated and 
measured is “poverty.” 
the “poorest” group (Figure 2). Since there are 300 
nonclients, each group contains 100 households each. 
The cut-off scores for each tercile define the limits of 
each poverty group. Client households are then cate-
gorized into the three groups based on their household 
scores.  
If the pattern of client households’ poverty matches 
hat of the nonclient households, client households 
would divide  equally among  the three  poverty group- 
 
Figure 2. Constructing poverty groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To guide evaluators in applying the field research 
tool and to estimate the poverty index, a manual has 
been written that will be published by CGAP (see 
Henry et al. 2000). An evaluation involves conducting 
a household survey with a random sample of 300 non-
client households and 200 client households within the 
operational area of the MFI. On average, conducting 
the interview takes about 15 minutes. 
To use the poverty index for making comparisons, 
the nonclient sample is first sorted in an ascending 
order according to its index score. Once sorted, non-
client households are divided in terciles based on their 
index score: the top third of the nonclient households 
are grouped in the “less poor” group, the middle third 
grouped  in the  “poor” group and  the  bottom third  in  
ings just as the nonclient households, with 33 percent 
falling in each group. Hence any deviation from this 
equal proportion signals a difference between the cli-
ent and the nonclient population. For instance, if 60 
percent of the client households fall into the first er-
cile or poorest category, the MFI reaches a dispro-
portionate number of very poor clients relative to the 
general population. 
 
 
 
The tool compares distributions of client and non-
client relative poverty levels by creating terciles of 
poverty groups based on poverty scores for nonclient 
households and adds MFI client households to these 
groupings according to their poverty-ranking scores. 
For example, MFIs having a greater share of their 
client households placed in the poorest tercile of the 
general  population  are  credited  with  having  a more  
The Results of a Poverty Assessment 
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favorable poverty outreach profile than MFIs having a 
smaller share assigned to the poorest tercile. Figure 3 
shows the outcome of a recent assessment in one of the 
case-study countries. 
 
 
Figure 3. Results of a recent MFI poverty-
assessment case 
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It is recommended that assessment of the MFI’s 
relative poverty outreach be made not only within the 
operational area of the MFI, but also in the context of 
regional poverty within a country. Recent research 
indicates that MFIs tend to locate their operations in 
above-average regions where transactions costs are 
lower and market volume is higher (Sharma and Zeller 
1999). In addition, to assess the MFI’s poverty out-
reach on an internationl scale, it is recommended that 
the country’s poverty level be compared with those of 
other developing countries. The tool recommends this 
relative poverty comparison based on the Human 
Development Index (HDI), developed by the United 
Nations Development Program, and published annual-
ly in the Human Development Report. On average, 
households located in countries registering relatively 
low HDI rankings can be seen as relatively poorer than 
households from countries ranked higher in HDI. 
 
 
 
During the second half of 1999, the methodology 
was field tested by IFPRI in collaboration with nation-
al research institutions and counterparts in four case 
studies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Overall, 
these tests have shown that the tool is useful and 
sufficiently simple for evaluating the poverty outreach 
of MFIs in an operational context. Moreover, the case 
studies have shown that the four MFIs differ not only 
in terms of poverty outreach, but also in the mission 
they define for themselves, the type of market niche 
they seek for themselves, their preference for a specific 
type of institutional culture, and a host of conditions 
imposed by other external actors at various levels. 
Poverty assessment results have to be interpreted in 
light of these considerations. Ig oring them or pro-
viding incomplete information on institutional details 
fails to tell a complete story. Before recommending the 
use of the poverty assessment tool for widespread use, 
the tool ought to be further tested and eventually im-
proved. For this purpose, a manual will be dissemi-
nated by CGAP that will assist future users in applying 
the tool.¾ 
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2000. Assessing the relative poverty of microfinance 
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POLICY BRIEF No. 11   •   JULY  2000 
The question raised in the title is an important one to the 
microfinance sector, especially since the Microcredit Summit 
held in Washington, DC, in 1997. In order to gain more 
transparency on the depth of poverty outreach, the Con-
sultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) supported 
research at IFPRI during 1999 and 2000 to design and test a 
simple, low-cost operational tool to measure the poverty 
level of MFI clients relative to nonclients. This policy brief 
informs about the results from recent case studies on the 
poverty outreach of four selected microfinance institutions 
(for more information, see Sharma et al. 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The case studies were conducted for four MFIs world-
wide: MFI A (Central America), MFI B (East Africa), MFI C 
(Southern Africa), and MFI D (South Asia). In each country, 
300 nonclients and 200 new clients of MFIs were randomly 
selected. The nonclients were used as a comparison group, 
and resided in the operational area of the MFI. On average, 
about six to eight enumerators in each country carried out the 
field research in a time span of four to six weeks. The field 
research cost, including data entry, ranged between 
US$5,000 and US$14,000. The selected four MFIs consti-
tuted a heterogeneous group serving a diverse set of clientel  
and using different approaches to service delivery. A brief 
background of each MFI is provided next and summarized in 
Table 1. 
Founded in 1989, MFI A is the largest microfinance insti-
tution in this Central American country. By 1999, MFI A 
counted 11 branches and served around 14,500 clients, most-
ly in urban and semi-urban locations. The stated objective of 
the MFI is to reach all segments of the population that 
demand financial services for the development of their 
micro-, small-, and medium-scale enterprises. To reach this 
diverse clientele, MFI A offers a range of loan and savings 
products. Loan sizes range from US$20 to several thousand 
dollars. Apart from credit services, a number of savings 
products seek to also address poorer segments of the popu-
la ion. MFI A uses an individual loan methodology and does 
no  directly employ targeting methods to reach poorer 
clientele. 
An NGO founded in 1981, MFI B, located in Eastern 
Afr ca, provides loans specifically to women in business. In 
1997 MFI B established four regional offices, all located in 
areas with above average population density and high levels 
of small business activity, and established both urban- and 
rural-based lending groups. MFI B now provides services to 
nearly 17,000 women entrepreneurs. To qualify for MFI B 
services, prospective clients must organize into groups of 
approximately 20 members, guarantee one another and save 
a certain amount each week. In addition, individuals must 
receive a favorable business assessment from both MFI B 
and other group members. 
Operating in a Southern African country, MFI C is a credit 
and savings cooperative founded in 1993. In 1999, MFI C 
counted four branches and 58 local units, serving around 
22,000 members, in both urban and rural locations. As a 
cooperative, MFI C requires its members to purchase shares 
and save for six months before receiving a loan. MFI C uses 
no explicit targeting methods and draws members from all 
segments of the population. MFI C employs an individual 
loan methodology. Since the beginning of the year 1999, 
however, MFI C launched a new program that specifically 
targets poor women. This new program requires that women 
clients form solidarity groups of five members and loans are 
provided without any prerequisite savings.
MFI D, established in 1989 in a South Asian country, 
provides credit and saving services to a targeted group of 
around 31,000 clients, mainly poor rural women, through a 
n twork of 19 branch offices in one particular state of the 
country. Eligibility for the program is tested using a house-
hold questionnaire and, following the Grameen Bank meth-
odology, loans are provided without any collateral to clients 
who form groups of five. Clients are also required to make 
weekly contributions to a saving account.  
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Characteristics ofthe Selected 
Microfinance Institutions 
All four institutions were found to reach clients that were 
as poor as the poorest third of nonclients residing in the 
operational area of the MFI. However, there were large 
differences in the depth of poverty outreach between the 
MFIs. 
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Table 1. Summary characteristics of case study MFIs 
MFI characteristics 
Case 
study 
MFI Location 
Year of 
establish-
ment 
Stated 
mission/ 
goals 
Number 
of branches 
Areas 
served Methodology Target clients Products 
Number 
of clients 
(1999) 
          
MFI A Central 
America 
1989 Provide 
services to 
micro, small, 
and medium 
enterprises 
11 branches Mostly 
urban and 
semi-urban 
locations 
Individual loan 
contracts 
No explicit 
targeting; some 
services 
specifically 
tailored to poor 
Loan size varies 
from $20 to several 
thousand; savings 
products for the 
poor 
14,500 
          
MFI B East Africa 1981 Provide 
services to 
women in 
business 
4 regional 
branches 
Areas with 
high 
population 
density and 
high levels 
of business 
activity 
Group guarantee; 
compulsory 
savings  
Women in 
business only; 
business plan 
must be 
approved 
Loan size varies 
from $285-429 
17,000 
          
MFI C Southern 
Africa 
1993 Provide 
services to all 
segments of 
population + 
recently stared 
program for 
poor women 
4 branches 
and 58 local 
units 
Urban and 
rural 
Shareholders 
entitled to loan 
amount four times 
the amount of 
saving deposit. 
 
Women’s 
program requires 
group formation. 
No explicit 
targeting for 
ordinary share-
owning 
members. A 
recently 
initiated 
program 
specifically 
targets poor 
women. 
Loans of $25 and 
above for  
women’s groups. 
Share paying 
members can 
access loans equal 
to 4 times the 
amount saved. 
22,000 
          
MFI D South Asia 1989 Provides 
services 
specifically to 
poor  women 
19 branch 
offices 
Mostly rural  Loans based on 
group guarantee; 
compulsory 
saving plan. 
Specifically 
targets poor 
women only 
Loan size varies 
from $100-300.  
31,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 Poverty has many dimensions, and a range of poverty 
indicators is required to capture these dimensions. Using 
various statistical techniques described in the manual for the 
poverty assessment tool (see Henry et al. 2000), a poverty 
index is used to aggregate the information contained in each 
of the poverty indicators. This index weighs the relative 
poverty of each household relative to all others and provides 
a ranking score. The ranking score indicates how each house-
hold’s estimated poverty level compares with those of all 
other households surveyed. The higher the score is, the rela-
tively less poor the household is. 
 To use the poverty index for making comparisons, the 
nonclient sample is first sorted in an ascending order accord-
ing to its index score. Once sorted, nonclient households are 
divided in terciles based on their index score: the top third of 
the nonclient households are grouped in the “less poor” 
group, the middle third grouped in the “poor” group, and the 
bottom third in the “poorest” group. Since there are 300 
nonclients, each group contains 100 households each. The 
cutoff scores for each tercile define the limits of each poverty 
group. Client households are then categorized into the three 
groups based on their household scores. 
 If the pattern of clients’ poverty matches that of the non-
clients, clients would divide equally among the three relative 
poverty groups just as the nonclients, with 33 percent falling 
in each group. Hence any deviation from this equal propor-
tion signals a difference between the client and the nonclient 
population. For instance, if 60 percent of the client house-
holds fall  into the first  ercile  or poorest  category, the MFI  
 
reaches a disproportionate number of very poor clients 
relative to the general population. 
 
 
 
 
 Each of the four case studies uses 15-20 indicators that are 
used to construct the country-specific poverty index. These 
indicators combine different dimensions of poverty concern-
ing human resources, housing conditions, assets, and food 
sec rity and vulnerability. Nine indicators were commonly 
used in at least three of thefour country case studies. 
 Human resources. Eight indicators related to human 
resources are used in the four case studies. These indicators 
reflect the level of education in the household and the pres-
en e of unskilled labor force. The percentage of wage labor-
ers in the household seems to be particularly important in the 
relatively poorer countries of Southern Africa and South 
Asia (MFI C and MFI D). The indicator expressing whether 
the household head achieved the secondary school level is 
important in countries with relatively high literacy rates 
(MFI A and MFI B). 
 Dwelling. Dwelling indicators discriminated among rela-
tive poverty levels well. In the case of MFI D in South Asia, 
8 out of 20 indicators related to housing quality. The impor-
tance of dwelling indicators in South Asia supports the use of 
the housing index as an important indicator of poverty in that 
regio . However, in the African cases (MFI B and MFI C), 
where housing is relatively homogenous, only four or five 
housing indicators were used. Th  presence or quality of la-
trines appears in  all the case  studies. House size (number of 
rooms per person) is used in three countries. 
A Brief Narrative of the Methodology 
The Poverty Indicators Used to 
Compute the Poverty Index 
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 Assets. A total of 15 indicators on the number or value of 
assets are included in the four case studies. They ar  particu-
larly important (5 out of 17 indicators) in the Central Am ri-
can country (MFI A), the most well-off country of the 
sample. The amount of land possessed is important only for 
MFIs serving rural and agricultural areas, as is the case in 
MFI D. 
 Food security and vulnerability. These indicators turn 
out to be very important in explaining differences in relative 
poverty in all four studies, particularly in the Southern Afri-
can country (MFI C), which is the poorest among the four 
according to its value for the Human Development Index 
published by the UNDP. The indicator of chronic hunger 
(enough to eat in the last 12 months) appears in all four 
cases. Indicators of short-term hunger (enough to eat in the 
last 30 days) and of consumption of luxury food during the 
week appear in three cases. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 presents the results for MFI A. The distribution of 
its clients across the three poverty groups closely mirrors the 
distribution of nonclients, indicating that MFI A serves a 
clientele that is quite similar to the general population in its 
operational area. This result is consistent with MFI A’s 
stated objective of reaching micro, small, and medium enter-
prises and the diversity in the financial products that it offers. 
 
Figure 1 
MFI A: Distribution of client and nonclient households 
across poverty groups 
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Figure 2 shows that the poorest households are underrep-
resented among MFI B clients. However, about one-half of 
the clients fall into the two poorest categories, which is 
remarkable considering the mission of the institution (to 
reach all women in business), the focus of the product (to 
finance businesses after submitting a business plan), and the 
lack of overt targeting. 
About half of MFI C’s clients belong to the “less poor” 
group while they are underrepresented in the poorest group 
(Figure 3). This result reflects the fact that MFI C’s member-
ship is share-based and open to all individuals. However, 
poverty outreach is significantly higher when considering 
only clients belonging to the new program fr women. 
Nearly one-half (45.2 percent) of these clients belonged to 
the “poorest” group, and only 19 percent of the new women 
clients belong to the “less poor” group. 
 
Figure 2 
MFI B: Distribution of client and nonclient households 
across the poverty groups 
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Figure 3 
MFI C: Distribution of client and nonclient households 
across poverty groups 
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 Figure 4 indicates quite clearly that the poorest groups are 
strongly overrepresented and that less poor householdsare 
underrepresentd among MFI D’s clients. This result is not 
only consistent with MFI D’s explicit aim to serve the poor-
est households in its operational area but also indicates 
considerable success in its targeting practices. 
The Results 
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Figure 4 
MFI D: Distribution of client and onclient households 
across poverty groups 
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A comprehensive assessment of an MFI must include an 
evaluation of how its poverty outreach record reconciles with 
its mission and program objectives. As the case studies have 
shown, MFIs differ in terms of geography, their stated mis-
sion, the type of market niche they seek, and a host of other 
factors, such as the relative development level of he area in 
which the MFI operates in relation to the national average. 
Moreover, reaching moderately poor people in a very poor 
country may be more difficult to achieve than reaching the 
poorest in a relatively wealthy country that has well-devel-
oped institutions and infrastructure. Ignoring these consider-
ations or providing incomplete information on institutional 
details fails to tell a complete story. 
The case studies have contributed to the development and 
testing of a relatively simple tool that can be used to assess 
the poverty level of MFI clients. The four case study MFI 
managers unanimously considered the results to be credible 
and comprehensive for their institutions. The results also are 
consistent with the mission, priorities, and targeti g practices 
of the case study MFIs. The Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poorest (CGAP) looks forward to testing the poverty 
measurement tool with a number of other MFIs over the 
coming year to further refine and improve the tool.¾
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POLICY BRIEF No. 12   •   JULY  2000 
Joint liability group lending is currently the lending 
technology of choice of microfinance institutions 
because of the success of the Grameen Bank, which 
is using the technology to successfully lend to 
millions of poor Bangladeshi women. It is widely 
believed that the incentives for peer-selection, peer-
monitoring, and peer pressure resulting from the 
joint liability clause are responsible for the high 
repayment rates of the Grameen Bank and other 
similar microfinance institutions. The analysis and 
findings presented in this brief are the results of 
research undertaken by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Bunda Col-
lege of Agriculture on the practice and performance 
of joint liability group lending in Malawi. This 
research provides vidence on the extent to which 
peer selection, peer monitoring, and peer pressure 
are taking place in the credit groups affiliated to the 
Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC), the main 
microfinance institution in Malawi, and their impact 
on the joint liability on loan repayment.  
 The empirical findings of the study contrast with 
the conventional wisdom and assumptions regarding 
the informational advantage of the joint liability and 
its implications for incentives for peer selection, 
peer monitoring, peer pr ssure, and loan repayment. 
In particular, the findings do not support the widely 
held presumption that joint liability is responsible 
for the high repayment rates of the successful group 
lending programs. In fact, the study finds a negative 
impact of the joint liability clause on the repayment 
outcomes of MRFC credit groups. The main find-
ings and policy implications of the report are sum-
marized below. 
 1. The relative value that borrowers attach to 
access to future credit is found to be the most im-
portant factor that motivates them to repay their 
loans and that of defaulters in their groups. The 
average amount MRFC borrowers are willing to pay 
in order to maintain their access to credit is found to 
be 523 Malawi kwacha (about US$12) or 24 percent 
of he average loan size per member. This is more 
than the 15 percent up-front cash deposit that the 
MRFC seasonal agricultural group members are re-
quired to pay. Hence, the findings demonstrate that 
a lending policy of gradually increasing the loan 
sizes of good and repeat borrowers (which increases 
the value of maintaining future access to credit) will 
have a positive impact on repayment rates and that 
higher interest rates (which increase both the value 
of defaulting on a current loan and that of the 
defaulted loans that must be repaid by nondefaulters 
under the joint liability rule) will have a negative 
mpact on repayment rates.
 2. Peer selection is very limited in MRFC credit 
groups because of the significant influence that 
extension workers, credit assistants, and village 
authorities have on the formation and com-
position of MRFC credit groups. The study found 
tha  90 percent of the groups include members from 
f milies of their respective village authorities. In 
terms of wealth, MRFC credit group members are 
also found to be, on average, the same or richer than 
the rest of the population in their respective villages. 
These findings imply that powerless ordinary village 
residents are in a situation where, often, their only 
choice is either joining the only credit group in the 
villag in which they have very little or influence on 
its membership composition, or be without credit. 
 3. Not much effective peer monitoring is taking 
place in MRFC credit groups because of the non-
pecuniary “social cost” associated with it. For ex-
ample, the lack of effectiveness of the group moni-
toring committees has been attributed to the fact that 
committee members are usually fearful of being 
seen by  other members  a  spying  on or  interfering  
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with other members’ private businesses. Another 
explanation for the relatively limited peer monitor-
ing is provided by the fact that MRFC credit group 
members are usually from more than one village 
(three on average). But, even when an effective peer 
monitoring takes place, its effect on loan repayment 
is not as important as it is believed to be because the 
main reason for default in MRFC credit groups is 
unwillingness to repay and not inability to repay. 
Indeed, unwillingness to repay is found to be the 
first cause of default in MRFC credit groups (25 
percent of all defaults). Furthermore, the analysis of 
the reasons for default in MRFC credit groups 
shows that at most, 37 percent of the defaults in 
MRFC credit groups could have been possibly pre-
vented by a more effective peer monitoring. 
 4. The monitoring activities of extension 
workers are very important for the well function-
ing and performance of MRFC credit groups. 
Extension workers play an important role, for 
example, in ensuring that in-kind loan packages, 
consisting mostly of fertilizer and seed, are not 
resold by borrowers. In the case of tobacco farmers, 
they are also involved in ensuring that all group 
members send their harvested tobacco on time t  the 
tobacco auction floors instead of selling them to 
intermediate buyers. This part of their monitoring 
work is very important for MRFC because of its 
arrangements with the auction floors that allow 
MRFC to deduct the amounts owed by tobacco 
groups directly from the proceeds of their tobacco 
sales. Monitoring activities are usually undertaken 
in conjunction with their extension work and ex-
tension workers have strong incentives to give 
special attention to the credit groups in their sections 
because of the way they are rewarded in their jobs. 
 5. Peer pressure takes place less frequently 
than implied by the joint liability, and when it 
does take place, it is more likely to fail than to 
succeed in inducing defaulters to repay their 
loans. The relatively few instances of use of peer 
pressure are explained by the nonnegligible “social 
costs” that nondefaulters incur when they peer pres-
sure defaulters. The evidence indicates that active 
peer pressure serves more as a credible mechanism 
for good borrowers to signal to future potential 
defaulters their willingness to apply peer pressure 
than a mechanism for recovering current defaulted 
loans. 
 6. Joint liability has negative impacts on the 
loan repayment of MRFC credit groups. The 
study found that MRFC groups that expected the 
joint liability not to be fully enforced performed 
much better in terms of repayment rates than groups 
in which the joint liability was expected to be fully 
enforced. The impact of the joint liability on en-
forcement is also found to worsen wh n some 
members have some doubt about the repayment 
intentions of other members in their groups—a 
situation that occurred in 62 percent of MRFC credit 
groups. Furthermore, the majority of the partially 
paid delinquent loans consist of good borrowers 
who are defaulting because of the joint-liabil ty 
natu e of contracts. 
 
 
 Based on the above findings, it is concluded that 
(1) the prominence given to the joint liability in 
explaining the high repayment rates does not hold 
up universally and (2) microfinance institutions 
targeted to poor people can operate successfully and 
achieve high loan recovery rates if they develop 
lending technologies that do not rely on collateral, 
but instead cultivate borrowers’ expectations for 
higher and continuous access to credit, and establish 
an effective screening and monitoring system using 
their field staff. Empirical findings also suggest that 
joint liability can have a negative impact on loan 
repayment. This calls for institutions such as the 
MRFC to reconsider its inflexible full group joint 
liability policy (no new loans to any borrower until 
all loans are repaid), an arrangement generally dis-
liked by the majority of its borrowers. It is recom-
ended that MRFC adopt a limited group joint lia-
bility policy in which defaulters are excluded from 
the groups and nondefaulters are issued new loans 
when they pay a reasonable monetary penalty not 
tied to the total amounts of the defaulted loans. This 
more flexible group joint liability policy has the 
pot tial to yield both l wer delinquency rates while 
retaining most of the cost-saving advantages of 
lending through groups. Finally, it is important to 
no e that the proposed limited joint liability policy is 
different from a simple relaxation of the full joint 
liability in that it does not penalize nondefaulters in 
defaulting groups. Such simple relaxation—which 
usually takes the form of a policy of issuing new 
loans to nondefaulters in groups with repayment 
rates above some threshold value—h s been experi-
mented with in Malawi under the SACA program 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s with poor 
results.¾ 
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POLICY BRIEF No. 13   •   JULY  2000 
Two common approaches are used for measuring 
household access to credit and credit constraints in 
the literature. The first method infers the presence of 
credit constraints from violations of the assumptions 
of the life cycle/permanent income hypothesis. 
More precisely, the method uses household con-
sumption and income data to look for a significant 
dependence (or “excess sensitivity”) of consumption 
on transitory income. Empirical evidence of a sig-
nificant dependence is taken as an indication of bor-
rowing or liquidity constraint. The second method 
uses direct information on households’ participation 
and experiences in the credit market to classify them 
as credit constrained or not. This classification is 
then used in reduced form regression equations to 
analyze the determinants of the likelihood of a 
household being credit constrained. While inference 
based on the first method may not always be correct, 
the second method does not allow quantification of 
the level of credit constraint. This brief outlines a 
methodology based on the credit limit concept that 
allows a more satisfactory analysis of the deter-
minants of a household’s access to credit. 
 
 
 
 
 In general, lenders are constrained by factors out-
side their control on the maximum amount they can 
possibly lend to any potential borrower. Conse-
quently, any borrower, however creditworthy he is, 
faces a limit on the overall amount he can borrow 
from any given source of credit; regardless of how 
much of an interest rate he is willing to pay and/or 
collateral he is willing to put up to back the loan. 
Furthermore, due to the possibility of default and 
lack of effective contract enforcement mechanisms, 
lenders have the incentive to further restrict the 
pply of credit even if they have more than enough 
to meet a given demand and the borrower is willing 
to pay a high enough interest rate. Therefore, from 
the borrower=s view, the relevant limit on supply is 
not the maximum the lender is able to lend, but 
rather the maximum the lender is willing to lend. 
The latter perceived maximum limit or credit limit 
that cannot be exceeded when borrowing, regardless 
of how much interest one is willing to pay, is the 
focus of the methodology used in this brief for 
quantifying the extent of household access to credit. 
 
 
 
 The conceptual framework follows from a 
contract-theoretic view of loan transaction. It is 
essentially based on the fact that the credit limit 
va iable, bmax facing a potential borrower and the 
amount the potential lender wants to be repaid are 
the variables that lenders can choose. On the other 
hand, the optimal amount b* to be borrowed within 
the ange set by the lender remains the sole choice 
of the borrower, who also chooses ex post (i.e., once 
the loan is disbursed) whether and when to pay back 
the loan. 
 The lender’s optimal choice of bmax, which is 
interpreted as the supply for credit, is determined by 
the maximum he is able to lend,bamax. It is also a 
fun tion of the lender’s subjective assessment of the 
lik lihood of default and of other borrower charac-
teristics. Similarly, the optimal interest rate  chosen
by the lender is a function of bamax, the demand-for-
credit function in the traditional me ning of the 
term. The fact that b* is a function of bmax in 
ddition to being a function of the interest rate is a 
mere reflection of the borrowing constraint and the 
imperfect substitutability of the different sou ces of 
loans. However, because of imperfections in the 
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enforcement of the loan contract and the resulting 
adverse selection, the demand for credit need not be 
a downward-sloping function of the interest rate. 
 
 
 
 
 Access to formal credit is often confused with 
participation in formal credit programs. Indeed, the 
two concepts are often used interchangeably in 
many credit studies. The crucial difference between 
the two concepts lie  in the fact that participation in 
a credit program is something that households 
choose to do freely, while access to a credit program 
is a limiting constraint put upon them (availability 
and eligibility criteria of credit programs, for ex-
ample). The lack of access to credit from a given 
source of credit can be defined as when the maxi-
mum credit limit bmax for that source of credit is 
zero. That is, one has access to a certain type of 
credit when its maximum credit limit bmax for that 
type is strictly positive; and one improves one’s 
access to that type of credit by increasing bmax for 
that type of credit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 The observations above suggest that the maxi-
mum credit limit a borrower faces depends on both 
the lender’s and borrower’s characteristics and 
actions. But also, it depends on random events that 
affect the fortune of lenders and other potential 
borrowers (who may compete with the borrower for 
the same possible credit). For example, one can 
expect the occurrence of drought in a rural agricul-
ture-based economy to reduce the supply of infor-
mal credit, while also increasing the number of 
people looking for loans. Hence, the maximum 
credit limit bmax facing a potential borrower is 
determined by events, some of which are under the 
borrower=s control, others under the lender’s control, 
and still others outside the control of both. 
 The fact that bmax depends on random events also 
implies that its realized value at the time when bor-
rowing actually takes place cannot be known 
exactly in advance by either the lender or the bor-
rower. The borrower can only form “expectations” 
about the likely value of bmax at the time of actual 
borrowing. But formal lenders usually provide 
enough information about their loan policy (eligi-
bility criteria, types of project funded, collateral and 
down-payment requirements, etc.) to enable po-
tential borrowers to have reasonably accurate 
“expectations” about their bmax from each source of 
formal credit. In the cases of NGO- and govern-
ment-supported credit programs, they even usually 
et and announce fixed credit limits for all potential 
borrowers. 
 Furthermore, at the time of borrowing it is only 
the lender who observes the realized value of bmax 
(which he himself determines), and may or may not 
have the opportunity to reveal it to the borrower. For 
example, if the borrower’s r alized optimal choice 
of loan size is strictly positive but strictly less than 
the r alized value of bmax, then the lender may never 
have the chance to tell the borrower his actual 
realized choice of bmax. Clearly, if at a particular 
t me a borrower does not ask for a loan from a given 
source of credit, he will never learn, even in retro-
spect, about his realized bmax from that source of 
credit at that time (there may be exceptions in the 
cases of NGO- and government-supported credit 
programs, which set and announce fixed credit 
li its for all potential borrowers). However, the 
potential borrower will always have “exp ctations” 
on what would have been the likely value of bmax at 
that time. Furthermore, it is precisely the borrower’s 
prior “expectations” about the likely value of bmax 
and its variability that influence his behavior and 
make him decide in particular whether or not to seek 
a loan from that particular source of credit. Many 
“discouraged borrowers” do not seek any loan 
because either they expected to face zero or very 
low bmax, or they expected a relative high cost 
(including transaction costs) for getting loans. The 
“discouraged borrowers” may have been wrong in 
their expectations and could perhaps obtain worth-
while loans at reasonable costs. Even when a bor-
rower seeks a loan from a given source of credit, the 
r al zed value of the optimal loan size is largely 
determined by his “expectations” about his bmax 
(especially if the borrower has reasonably accurate 
information that allows him to predict well the 
location of bmax). 
 The framework outlined above implies that bor-
rower’s “expectations” about bmax are much more 
mportant in determining the actually demanded 
amounts of credit than the realiz d values of bmax. In 
empirical work it is possible to collect information 
on the borrower’s expected bmax from different 
sources of credit. An example of two studies—one 
i Malawi and the other in Bangladesh—is cited 
below.¾ 
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This brief considers the scope for policy action in seven 
areas: (1) regulation of microfinance institutions, 
(2) provision of saving services, (3) product innovation, 
(4) organizational issues in microfinance, (5) poverty 
impact of microfinance, (6) agricultu al finance, and (7) 
subsidy and sustainability issues. 
 
 
 
 The principal objective of regulation should be to 
create a policy and legal framework that makes it feasible 
and attractive for microfinance institutions (MFIs) to 
operate in rural areas and serve the poor on a sustainable 
basis. To the clients, especially the savers, prudential 
regulation increases the level of confidence in banking 
transactions.  
 Three priority areas are noted: (1) prudential regulation 
enabling secure and sustainable internal financial 
management, (2) specific regulation governing trans-
actions between financial agents and institutions, and (3) 
regulation ensuring competitive conditions. 
 
 
 
 It is recognized that (1) the poor place great value on 
saving services when suchervices match their saving 
patterns and (2) mobilization of local saving provides 
MFIs a reliable, inexpensive, and sustainable source of 
funds for on-lending. Well-designed saving services 
therefore are indispensable characteristics of a successful 
microfinance institution. 
 
________________ 
*This is a summary of the conclusions and recommendations 
resulting from the international workshop on Innovations in 
Microfinance for the Rural Poor: Exchange of Knowledge 
and Implications for Policy, 8-13 November, 1998, in Accra, 
Ghana. The workshop was jointly organized by Deutsche 
Stiftung für Internationale Entwicklung (DSE), the Inter-
national Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 
 
 In order to be successful, saving services have to 
respond to the level and patterns of saving by the poor. 
Liquidity and safety of deposits are of primary concern to 
poor households. Hence, flexibility in deposits and 
withdrawals as well as assurance of safe, prompt, and 
reliable service become important factors in designing 
successful saving products. 
 
 
 
 As with savings, innovations in financial products need 
to be primarily demand-oriented. It is only when products 
match clients' preferences that a market niche for MFIs is
established and pricing at full cost—a requirement for 
fi a cial sustainability—becomes at all feasible. Supply-
side considerations are important too, for there needs to 
be a conducive policy environment that nurtures and pro-
vides incentives for MFIs to innovate and improve. For 
this reason, regulatory conditions as well as the organiza-
tion and management structure of MFIs become 
important determinants of the pace and quality of product 
innovations. 
 Demand-Oriented Innovation. A closer understand-
ing of demand patterns and preference structure of poor 
rural households is essential for demand-induce  innova-
tion. This requires continuous action-oriented interaction 
between practitioners/program managers and their clients. 
Decentralization in decision-making and adequate repre-
sentation of the clients in he governance and manage-
ment structure are powerful catalysts for innovations. 
 Collateral Substitutes. Developing collateral substi-
tutes represents one important line of innovations that can 
greatly improve access of the poor who generally lack 
traditional collateral-suitable assets. Making use of local 
information to trigger positive group dynamics as well as 
bringing down costs of group-based participation is likely 
to have beneficial effects. There also remains scope for 
finding new collateral substitutes in individual-based 
l nding. In general, not just physical assets, but many 
o r things that are regarded to have some intrinsic 
value in a particular society—general reputation, threat of  
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public citation of default, sanction by village or society 
elders—can potentially be used as a collateral subsitute. 
Better training of MFI staff in loan appraisal methods can 
assist them in recognizing good borrowers. Further, 
introducing incentive systems for MFI staff based on loan 
performance can also lead to better monitoring and 
enforcement of loan contracts. 
 Insurance Products. Income variability and unex-
pected expenditures arising from illness and other 
emergencies put considerable stress on the food security 
and livelihood of the poor. Hence insurance products are 
highly valued. Though credit and saving products 
themselves act as good insurance substitutes, innovations 
that reduce the cost of providing health, accident, and life 
insurance will have considerable impact on the poor. It is 
admitted that introducing innovations in this area is 
highly challenging. A first stepfor MFIs could be to 
consider retailing insurance products provided by formal 
financial institutions and make further assessments based 
on this experience. 
 
 
 
 Organization principles adopted have to be strictly 
aligned with organizational objectives. A widely endorsed 
objective is that MFIs develop a high level of competence 
in providing a core set of financial services in a sustain-
able manner. 
 Strategic Organization and Management. Whether 
member-based or not, organization and management 
should be based on the adoption of an entrepreneurial 
culture that gives due attention to market realities and 
potentials. A strong management information system that 
lets managers make decisions in the light of best possible 
information is also required. Hence, market analysis, 
product design, and incentive compatibility should be 
treated as key management concerns. This i cludes devel-
oping long-term relations with financial institutions in the 
private sector and negotiating a portfolio of investments 
and commercial loans that best suits the interest of the 
MFI. 
 Monitoring and Evaluation System. MFIs should 
establish and operationalize, on an ongoing basis, a moni-
toring and evaluation (M&E) system of their perfor-
mance. The system adopted should provide for meaning-
ful participation of MFI clients. 
 
 
 
 It is widely presumed that microfinance is an effective 
tool for poverty alleviation. In fact, it is this presumption 
that has fueled much of the support for allocating in-
creasing amounts of public resources to the microfinance 
sector. Hence, assessing and monitoring the mpact of 
MFIs on the livelihood of the poor as well as examining 
its cost-effectiveness vis-à-vis other poverty-alleviation 
measures is of interest not only to policy analysts, but 
also to concerned investors and managers of microfi-
nance. Empirical research so far points out—albeit not 
universally—to significant and sizable improvements in 
income and food expenditures, but documents little im-
pact on other welfare indicators such as nutrition, educa-
tion, and empowerment of women. Clarifying the rela-
tionship between poverty alleviation and microfinance 
services has implications not only on a more meaningful 
discussion of subsidies and sustainability of institutions, 
but also on operational matters such as service targeting 
and product innovation. For this reason, more research is 
eeded that leads to better impact assessment and also
one that helps microfinance practitioners to operationalize 
poverty targeting and monitoring. 
 
 
 
 Most of the world's poor consist of microentrepreneurs 
who are engaged in agricultural production on small 
farms. But providing financial services to this diverse 
group has been challenging for several reasons: they are 
vas ly spread geographically, making service delivery and 
information collection very costly; many of the farmers 
are illiterate; production is not only weather dependent 
and risky, but also rigidly cyclical. Yet MFIs risk bypass-
ing the poorest if this group is not serviced adequately. 
Hence, efforts to develop effective and sustainable micro-
finance services for small agricultural producers deserve 
priority. 
 
 
 
 The issue of sustainability of institutions and the role of 
subsidies is a complex one. On the one hand, setting up 
institutions that are financially unsustainable distorts in-
centives, makes institutions hostage to uncertain donor or 
government financing, and, in some cases, leads to mis-
targeting as richer and powerful groups preempt services 
av ilable at considerably below market prices. Further, as 
a number of empirical studies have shown, what is most 
valuable to the poor is access to services, as they are often 
willing to pay for services at full cost. The case for sub-
sidies, on the other hand, can also be quite compelling. 
Simply put, if microfinance services are, dollar for dollar, 
more effective in achieving some objectives compared to 
alt rnative poverty alleviation programs (e.g., other trans-
fer programs), then there is clearly a case for diverting 
public resources away from the latter into the micro-
finance sector.  
 Decisions on subsidies, deally, have to be made on a 
case-by-case basis and with full accounting of all costs 
and benefits. But this is more easily said than done, since 
benefits and costs are notoriously difficult to pinpoint and 
measure. 
 Best use of subsidies is found in helping build 
institutions that are likely to attain sustainability in a clear 
tim  frame. Contributions to finance initial investments in 
physical infrastructure and human capital development 
have high sustainable returns in the future. 
 Th re also exists substantial scope for additional 
research in clarifying the nature of cost and benefits of 
microfinance services and using this knowledge to 
develop sustainable institutional formats. Researchers 
need to work closely with both practitioners and policy-
makers for this effort to be successful.¾ 
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